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Abstract
The past two decades have witnessed a critical re-analysis of the many
African American urban “ghetto revolts” of the 1960s and 1970s. This paper
analyzes one of the one hundred fifty-seven violent incidents of the “Long Hot
Summer” of 1967, the Buffalo Uprising (June 26 – July 1, 1967). Building from
recent research which indicates this incident had deeply political overtones, this
work demonstrates the student-driven nature of the five-day rebellion, and the
internal collaboration participants engaged in during their violent and non-violent
activities. Drawing upon personally conducted interviews, interviews from 1967,
newspaper testimony, and various publications, this new understanding
complicates the current scholarly knowledge of this particular violent upheaval, as
well as larger implications in understanding the northern thrust of the Black
Liberation Movement.
Keywords: Buffalo, Rebellions, 1967, Insurgency, Students, Public Schools,
Protest
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Introduction
Between 1964 and 1972, the United States experienced the most violent
domestic upheaval since the Civil War.1 Across hundreds of segregated urban
ghettos, tens of thousands of Black Americans participated in incidents of mass
violence, often precipitated by white police brutality. African Americans burned
or attacked “local symbols of white American society, authority, and property in
[Black] neighborhoods—rather than against white persons.”2 These incidences
would often conclude after local or national state agents arrived. The “Americans
have been living in a nation and a national culture created in part by the extreme
violence of the 1960s and early 1970s.”3 “Commonly call[ed] ‘riots,’ or what
people left of center sometimes refer to as ‘civil disturbances’”4 political and
scholarly critiques of these events have ranged from acts of communal criminal
violence5 to expressions of black rage.6 However, the interpretation that these
incidents as criminal bursts of hostility has usually received the most traction.
Even those “sympathetic to these moments of violence often conclud[ing] that

1

Elizabeth Hinton, America on Fire: The Untold History of Police Violence and Black Rebellion
since the 1960s (New York City, NY: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2021), 2.
2
Otto Kerner et al., “Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,” Report of
the National Advisory Commission on civil disorders § (1968), 64.
3
Hinton, 3 (2021).
4
Ibid.
5
Lyndon Johnson, "The President's Address to the Nation on Civil Disorders.," The President's
Address to the Nation on Civil Disorders (The American Presidency Project, July 27, 1967),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-address-the-nation-civil-disorders.
6
Mark Goldman, High Hopes: The Rise and Decline of Buffalo, New York (Albany, New York:
State University of New York Press, 1983), 252.
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these so-called ‘riots’ derived from a pathological impulse, rooted in spontaneous,
uncontrollable emotion”7 amongst participants to recklessly destroy.
Several scholars in recent years, notably Elizabeth Hinton in 2021,
developed a new lens through which to examine the “riots.” Specifically, these
incidents should be “understood as rebellions of a sustained insurgency”8 against
the following factors: Hyper segregation, over-policing, economic disparity,
frustration with the non-violent tactics of the Civil Rights Movement, anti-Black
racist housing policies and white political domination. This evolved perspective
argues that many of these “riots” demonstrated a high level of internal
organization and group coherence, contrasting with the previous point of view
that they were disjointed purely political “riots.”
Newly released federal studies from the late 1960s support Hinton’s
argument. They indicate that participants conducted violence in a coordinated,
sophisticated manner in many smaller cities, often overlooked in the traditional
examination of the 1964 to 1972 period. Participants’ methods deliberately
differed whether it was night or daytime. At night, small, disciplined groups,
performed targeted acts of violence, like marking certain buildings for vandalism
while deliberately leaving others. In daytime hours, they negotiated with
municipal authorities for precise demands, like bargaining for the release of
prisoners. New Brunswick, New Jersey, Englewood, New Jersey, and Dayton,

7

Madeleine Schwartz. "Streets of Fire: New Books Include Historian's Narrative of Brutality,
Anger, and Revolt." Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University, May 5, 2021.
https://www.radcliffe.harvard.edu/news-and-ideas/streets-of-fire.
8
Peniel E. Joseph, "Recasting 'Riots' as Black Rebellions," The New York Times (The New York
Times, May 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/18/books/review/america-on-fireelizabeth-hinton.html.
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Ohio, include some of the most compelling examples of the previously described
coordinated tactics. The actions of those who participated in incidences in those
cities can no longer be studied as an anarchic, emotional outburst but rather as
organized insurgencies.
Each of the more than 2,0009 uprisings between 1964 to 1972 was
different, and each must (and in many cases have already been10, 11, 12) be
reexamined. In the 1960s, Buffalo intensely felt the devastating dual effects of
Northern depopulation and deindustrialization. Meanwhile, as the Civil Rights
Movement achieved hard-won but fruitful political and economic improvements
for Southern Blacks, “the quality of life for African Americans in Northern
cities...[steadily] deteriorated.”13 Beginning in 1965, the Johnson administration
declared war on crime, which increased police presence and invasiveness
dramatically across urban African American communities. At that time, Buffalo
was still an essential Great Migration hub, and the Black population was rising
steadily. The white-dominated city government was growing increasingly hostile
to this demographic change. The White flight created a complex environment of
pervasive state discrimination, economic disparity, and a near-constant police
presence. Thus, members of the East Buffalo Black community set forth on an

9

Hinton, 10 (2021).
Thomas J. Sugrue and Andrew P. Goodman, “Plainfield Burning,” Journal of Urban History 33,
no. 4 (2007): pp. 568-601, https://doi.org/10.1177/0096144207299182.
11
Laura Warren Hill, Strike the Hammer. The Black Freedom Struggle in Rochester, New York,
1940-1970 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021), 51-70.
12
Peter B. Levy, The Great Uprising Race Riots in Urban America during the 1960s (Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
13
Rowena Ianthe Alfonso, “‘They Aren't Going to Listen to Anything but Violence’: African
Americans and the 1967 Buffalo Riot.,’” Afro-Americans in New York Life and History 38, no. 1
(January 2014): pp. 81-117, 1.
10
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insurgency to ameliorate their economic, social, and political conditions. The
revolt would last five days, from June 26 to July 1, 1967.
Examining Buffalo’s revolt reveals that Black public-school student
notably made up the largest proportion of the Uprisings’ participants. For years,
the city's African American pupils had suffered from an increasingly segregated,
violent, and inadequate education that brutalized them and ultimately left them
unprepared to enter the job market. Buffalo schools intentionally isolated Black
students in the worst buildings, with the least experienced teachers, and spent less
per capita on their education than white students. Despite the city being twenty
percent Black, the Board of Education deliberately under employed non-white
educators to the point where most African American students never had a Black
teacher. The instructors they did have often beat them with paddles, a
disproportionate corporal punishment for minor infractions (or sometimes for no
reason) for the 1960s.
After multiple peaceful student protests went unacknowledged, Black
students planned an insurrection in the final weeks of the 1966 to 1967 school
year. Violence erupted against white instructors who notoriously tormented Black
students, who dreaded the start of summer, where they faced hiring discrimination
and idle poverty. This paper will demonstrate it was not a coincidence that the
conflagration began within a week of school ending. This project will illustrate
the underlying complexities, and deeply intense coherence of the Uprising to
come. This paper will show, through participants’ multi-faceted actions during

7
day and nighttime demonstrations, that there was a definitive logic and
coordination to the Uprising, in contrast to early literature regarding this time.
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Literature Review
The first academic scholarship about the 1967 Buffalo Uprising originated
from SUNY Buffalo Professor Frank P. Besag, in The Anatomy of a Riot: Buffalo,
1967. Three weeks after the Uprising, at the request of several black residents,
Besag created a study to survey the entire community on their feelings about the
incident. He and several research assistants conducted approximately 150
interviews with black and white residents of various ages and occupations. They
spoke with businesspeople of both races, police officers, onlookers, participants
and aimed to sketch a picture of what occurred between June 26 and July 1, 1967.
The study closely examined police logs, local media articles, and economic and
census data to surmise the causes of what occurred. Besag’s work presents a vivid
picture of intense racial hostility and widely diverging interpretations of what led
to the Uprising.
Besag noted that many of those surveyed in the city felt deeply confused
in the aftermath of the violence, because “a very different picture was presented
by out-of-town news media compared to the in-town media.”14 The out-of-town
narratives emphasized an insidious infiltration by left-wing and the Nation of
Islam, which incited young African Americans to indiscriminately destroy. Besag
and his colleagues, unsatisfied with this answer, wanted to arrive at “an objective
understanding of what happened and why?”15

14

Frank P. Besag and Philip J. Cook, The Anatomy of a Riot: Buffalo, 1967 (Buffalo, NY:
University Press, 1970), 2.
15
Besag & Cook, 2.
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Besag’s study revealed the specific grievances of participants as multifaceted. Besag reported that there were four major causes that coalesced to bring
these specific Black teenagers to collective violence. The teenagers that
participated in the Uprising had frequent negative interactions with law
enforcement that left them feeling powerless and abused. Their neighborhoods
had increased police presence, brutality, and harassment. The participants had a
general frustration and a consensus that society was working against them, both
“vocationally and socially.”16 Further, teenagers felt that the anti-poverty
government programs of the era “were of little use”17 and created false hope of a
better future. Finally, underemployment was the most significant complaint,
specifically Black’s only being able to access “menial [jobs] with little to no
prospect of future improvement.”18
The next substantive analysis of the Uprising comes from Historian Mark
Goldman’s 1983 High Hopes: The Rise and Decline of Buffalo, New York.
Written sixteen years after 1967, and not directly on the incident, Goldman
affirmed Besag’s view that white prejudice intensified the issues of African
Americans. Goldman passionately argued that “private prejudice [by whites
against Buffalo’s African Americans] was not dealt with but was rather translated
into public policy in such critical areas of urban life as housing and education”

16

Ibid., 15.
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
17
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Following Goldman’s argument, blacks were forced into what became a ghetto on
the East side of Buffalo.19
Political scholar Neil Kraus’s work was the next influential academic
analysis of the riot itself. His book, published in 2000, Race, Neighborhoods, and
Community Power: Buffalo Politics, 1934-1997, provided a more robust analysis
of the event than Goldman’s. For the first time, the Buffalo Race riot was
explicitly connected with the famed Kerner Report. This report is worthy of a
lengthy aside before returning to analyzing Neil Kraus’s contribution to
contemporary understanding of the Buffalo Race Riot.
In 1967, President Johnson established a bipartisan commission to
investigate the causes of the 1964 to 1967 civil unrest and provide
recommendations to prevent future upheaval. After a seven-month investigation,
“The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders” (colloquially known as
the Kerner Report) the commission found that only “compassionate, massive, and
sustained”20 investment in Black communities, an end to police brutality, and
many other reforms could prevent more violence. The report placed the blame for
these urban uprisings on white America, arguing that the riots proved to be
“outgrowth[s] of racial inequality and oppression rather than as acts of political or
criminal agitation.”21 These conclusions diverged from President Johnson’s point
of view. He believed the unrest had been incited by leftist radicals and
“hoodlums.” The Kerner Report famously warned that the United States’ “is

19

Mark Goldman, High Hopes before the Fall: The Rise and Decline of Buffalo, New York
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 288.
20
Kerner et al., 1.
21
Ibid., xxvi.
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moving toward two societies, one black and one white—separate and unequal.”22
The report ultimately contends that the rioters themselves did not indiscriminately
create violence and attack white people. Instead, the findings show that riots were
precipitated by an incident of white police brutality which, urban African
Americans teenagers and students responded to by burning or attacking local
symbols of white American society, authority, and property in [Black]
neighborhoods. The violence was directed at symbols rather than against white
persons.23
After more than thirty years, Kraus connected the Kerner Report to the
ongoing analysis of the Buffalo Uprising.24 Kraus argues that the Kerner Report's
findings are like other Buffalo Uprising research, as they all pointed to several
underlying causes of the unrest. In this analysis, Kraus hinted at the idea that
Black political awareness, not simply emotional rage, contributed to the violence
in Buffalo.
In 2014, Dr. Rowena Alfonso of the University of Toronto published a
landmark study, “They Aren't Going to Listen to Anything but Violence”: African
Americans and the 1967 Buffalo Riot” in which she confirmed and expanded
upon the Kerner Report’s findings. She argues the Buffalo Riot and other ghetto
riots like it were outraged responses to unfair economic, political, and social
conditions. Alfonso’s study proved a powerful analysis of the political intentions
of the participants in their violent activities, illustrating that these actions looked

22

Ibid., 1.
Ibid., 3.
24
Kraus, 128-129.
23
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to strike back against white institutions that made Black life so difficult, rather
than display outbursts of uncontrollable emotion.
Alfonso referenced fellow scholars who demonstrated the political
intentions of Black rioters during the 1960s and 1970s, such as Robin Kelly, Paul
A. Gilje, Heather Ann Thompson. Through a re-analysis of the Besag interviews,
she demonstrates that Black Buffalonian rioters had specific targets in mind when
they took to the streets between June 26 and July 1, 1967. These targets included
police stations, public housing administration offices, and white stores that
overcharged blacks, in their neighborhoods. This argument echoed the Kerner
Report’s assertion that Black rioters in general targeted “local symbols of white
American society, authority, and property in [Black] neighborhoods.”25 One
specific reinterpretation of a Besag interview with an eighteen-year-old Black
Buffalonian participant in the riot follows that:
Question: What is your present view on the rioting across the country?
Answer: I think it is the same thing all over the United States. The United
States are not going to give us our rights overnight. So, there is either
going to be a whole lot more rioting or they are going to have to ship us
out of the country. Question: Do you think this rioting will accomplish
anything? Answer: It will get the whitey to move faster, because he don't
[sic] want his businesses torn up.26
Alfonso explained, “[This] teenager's answers suggest that he viewed the riot as
an overtly political act. He believed that the riot was justifiable because the stores
that the rioters looted and vandalized were the same stores that practiced racial
discrimination against African Americans. Further, he contended that “rights,”
which referred to “full participation for African Americans in a democratic

25
26

Kerner et al., 64.
Alfonso, 86 (2014).
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society must be given or riots would continue.”27 This is one example of many
where interviewees exclaimed they specifically targeted white stores they felt had
exploited them with exorbitant prices28 and felt solidarity towards those who
rioted in other cities such as Cleveland and Detroit.29 These interviews highlight
that the high hopes for change from the Civil Rights Movement had fallen short
for them. Alfonso moves away from the notion that rioters took to the streets out
of pure emotion, but instead that they deliberately sought to destroy symbolic
areas of white oppression, such as police stations and white businesses.
The final scholarly analysis of the 1967 Buffalo Race riot also came from
Dr. Rowena Alfonso in 2015. In her work “Crucial to the Survival of Black
People’: Local People, Black Power, and Community Organizations in Buffalo,
New York, 1966–1968,” Alfonso focuses on the Black Power movement, which
began in 1966 by Stockley Carmichael’s assertion, “[if Black Americans] are to
proceed toward true liberation, we must cut ourselves off from white people. We
must form our own institutions, credit unions, co-ops, political parties, and write
our own histories.”30 Black Power advocates like Carmichael believed African
Americans needed autonomy from whites in order to gain political freedom.”31
Alfonso argues that this rhetoric galvanized a generation of Buffalo youth into
action and fueled participation in the 1967 Race Riots. Alfonso strengthens her
point by again returning to the Besag Anatomy interviews, noting that many riot
27

Ibid.
Ibid.
29
Ibid., 85.
30
“Black Power: Myth and Reality,” The New York Times, August 7, 1966, p. 152.
31
Rowena Ianthe Alfonso, “‘Crucial to the Survival of Black People’: Local People, Black Power,
and Community Organizations in Buffalo, New York, 1966–1968,” Journal of Urban History 43,
no. 1 (May 12, 2015): pp. 140-156, https://doi.org/10.1177/0096144215583984, 143.
28
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participants referred to one another as “soul brothers” and “soul sisters,” terms
that derive from Black Power lexicon.
However, Alfonso never claims the political acts of Buffalo rioters had a
definite, overall coordinated logic to them. While surmising that “some
participants implied there was a sense of logic to the riot...[as]...some interviewed
suggested that the rioters only targeted white-owned businesses for looting and
vandalism,”32 the scholar never goes any further in exploring if an internal
structure or general coherence to the Uprising existed.
A key source of evidence about the disturbances of 1967 has only come to
the surface in 2014 and entered mainstream academic scholarship in 2018: The
long government suppressed “Harvest of American Racism: The Political
Meaning of Violence in the Summer of 1967” report. During its seven-month
investigation, from July 1967 to February 1968, the Kerner Commission
sponsored internal “research projects” to answer more specific sub-questions the
group wanted to investigate. One such study, conducted by twenty-three social
scientists, and presented to the commission in November 1967, demonstrated that
“those who took to the streets [in the 1967 disturbances] weren’t merely frustrated
and filled with despair. They were politically engaged” and had an internal logic
to their Uprisings.33 Upon closer analysis, the social scientists found that multiple
uprisings revealed coordinated planning of participants as well as concrete
objectives.

32

Alfonso, 5.
Robert Shellow, “The Harvest of American Racism: The Political Meaning of Violence in the
Summer of 1967,” University of Michigan Press (Michigan Publishing University of Michigan
Press, 2018), https://www.press.umich.edu/9684889/harvest_of_american_racism.

33
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The sub-report sought to go beyond the more limited conclusions of the
Kerner Commission, which refused to acknowledge “the discovery of [this
internal structure... that persistently appeared in a number of the disturbances”34 in
the summer of 1967. However, deemed “far too radical”35 by the Commissioners,
the team was fired, its study quickly suppressed, and almost every copy
destroyed, “languish[ing] in the LBJ Presidential Library for fifty years,”36 and
only made public in 2014.
The “Harvest” report found that between 1964 and 1967, the actions of
participants in individual uprisings became “more pointed”37 and more internally
coordinated. In 1964, uprisings “were mainly negative reactions to instances of
perceived police misconduct and to the circumstances of ghetto life in general.”38
As the years wore on, “Negro demands...increasing[ly] [became] incorporated in
the riots themselves… [With for example]...instances of bargaining between
rioters and authorities hav[ing] grown in number… [along with]...attacks on
[mostly white] public buildings.”39 In several instances in 1967—such as
Plainfield, New Brunswick, and Englewood, New Jersey—Black youth met with
police officers or municipal authorities to demand economic concessions or the

34

Robert Scott Shellow and Michael C. Dawson, The Harvest of American Racism: The Political
Meaning of Violence in the Summer of 1967 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press,
2018), Foreword, 3.
35
Robert Shellow and Michael C. Dawson, “The Harvest of American Racism: The Political
Meaning of Violence in the Summer of 1967,” University of Michigan Press (Michigan
Publishing University of Michigan Press, 2018),
https://www.press.umich.edu/9684889/harvest_of_american_racism.
36
Shellow & Dawson, 3.
37
Ibid., 55.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
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release of certain arrested people, using the threat of imminent or continued
violence as leverage.
The “Harvest” report discovered that many uprisings exhibited a high
degree of internal coherence in their actions and purpose. In Englewood and New
Brunswick, New Jersey, “well-disciplined and purposeful ‘crowds’ of youths...
made plans to create disturbances as a means of impressing their political
demands upon local authorities [and then proceeded to execute such plans].”40
Participants demanded for the city to requisition more funds for recreation in
Black neighborhoods and release certain arrested persons. In Plainfield,
participants (“with great deliberateness and planning beforehand,”41) assembled
themselves and marched down a street with several businesses on it. The group
then broke the windows of a few “pre-planned targets”42 and voluntarily
dispersed.
Lastly, the “Harvest” report demonstrated that in many cities that
witnessed disturbances, public schools became sites of political clashes between
Black and white students and teachers. The social scientists reported this
connection to the disturbances: “School issues have been among the most
prominent ones raised by Negro youths.”43 They found that violent clashes
between Black students and white authorities had increasingly occurred
throughout the decade.44 Further, 1960s Black students felt they received harsher

40

Ibid., 43.
Ibid., 30.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid., 57.
44
Ibid.
41
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disciplining from teachers, discriminatory treatment from white students, and
exclusion from clubs and cheerleading squads.45
The “Harvest” report found evidence across the North, in cities large and
small, of Black students actively resisting racist treatment in a political and
organized fashion, both peacefully and violently. The year prior to the 1967
Detroit Uprising, Black students boycotted Northern High School on the city’s
East Side, in response to unfair treatment from their White principal. In Plainfield,
New Jersey, Black students boycotted their high school’s cafeteria and then
carried out a violent “campaign of intimidation against white students after a
white teacher was thought to have treated a [Black] student unfairly.”46 Similar
boycotts and organized resistance occurred in New Brunswick and Buffalo public
schools. The report supports the claim that these incidents had begun occurring at
an increased frequency in the “few years”47 leading up to 1967.
The most political Uprisings of 1967 had several precepts. In their sample,
the social scientists found that in
a number of...city disturbances, [the rebellions] took the form of political
confrontation, in which goals and processes were more explicit, form and
structure more evident. Cincinnati, Plainfield, and New Brunswick, New
Jersey…all had highly political riots. Each disturbance differed from the
other in important ways, but they all shared the common quality that
violence was being used in a quite instrumental way to achieve political
aims.48
Black youth often alternated nights of violent destruction in organized gangs
(specifically targeting white officers and pre-selected exploitative white

45

Hinton, 145-147 (2021).
Shellow & Dawson, 57.
47
Ibid.
48
Shellow & Dawson, 28.
46
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businesses for destruction) with days of discussion with city officials when they
would air their grievances and make demands. Or the socio-economic elite of a
Black ghetto would make such demands to city officials for greater youth
employment, playgrounds, and investigations of police brutality. For example, in
Cincinnati “...a number of sectors of the Negro community, acting in concert,
showed a high degree of coherence in the overall organization of the various
protest activities. Over the course of events, the actions of youths and adults can
be seen as meshing into each other in coherent and connected...ways.”49 However,
the “Harvest” report never deemed Buffalo, one of the twenty-three cities it
examined, an internally structured Uprising.
However, Buffalo in 1967 exhibited all these facets of other coordinated
Uprisings, displaying them in a combination of ways typical of internally
organized, cross-class structured violent political actions. While previous studies
have indicated the political nature of the Buffalo Uprising, such as those of Dr.
Rowena Alfonso, no study has ever tried to understand if individual actors in
Buffalo worked with one another to achieve a set of concrete objectives, as
happened in Plainfield, New Brunswick, and Cincinnati. Further, no study has
ever sought to understand what role the oppressive Buffalo Public School System
played in driving the Uprising. This question proves critical when one
understands that students, aged fourteen to nineteen, were the majority of those
who participated in the rebellion.

49

Ibid., 30.
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Closer analysis of the evidence points to organized gangs of students
targeting specific stores and telling black-business owners to mark their
businesses with “soul-brother” or “soul-sister” to prevent destruction.50 Both the
youth and adult-elite of East Buffalo attended multiple meetings with city
officials throughout the crisis, delivering lists of demands and airing grievances.
When white authorities failed to meet their demands, such as the night of June 29,
these gangs went to the street and continued violent activity. Interview testimony
from 1967 and 2022, articles from The New York Times, The Buffalo Courier, The
Buffalo Evening News, and The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette confirm this more
internally organized, student-driven interpretation of events. In this historical reexamination, student insurgents take on a far more coherent strategy in their
nighttime destruction and daytime discussions and demands with municipal
authorities during the day.
Buffalo proved a highly planned, internally coordinated, student-driven
rebellion. It had a clear sense to its alternation between violent activity and
peaceful discussion, like the internal organization of other “highly-pointed”51
incidents, such as in Plainfield and New Brunswick. Participants had clear targets
for destruction, as well as tangible demands. Spurred on by hundreds of current
and past students of the hyper-segregated Buffalo Public School System,
participants violently and non-violently sustained a grueling, five-day rebellion,
until community elders could leverage their collective violence into twenty-four
demands. These demands were presented to Mayor Frank Sedita on June 30, and

50
51

Alfonso, 3.
Ibid., 28.
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they prioritized employment and educational concessions. However, before
delving into a Buffalo specific analysis, it is critical to provide a greater context to
the history of mass racial violence in the twentieth century.

21

Chapter One: Black Urban Uprisings from 1943-196752
According to historians Isabel Wilkerson and Marilynn S. Johnson, the
history of modern urban Black rebellions begins with twin disturbances in Detroit
and Harlem during the summer of 1943.53, 54Amidst wartime demographic
changes and colossal economic developments, these two massive incidents
initiated a sharp break from previous racial violence. Since the end of the Civil
War (1865), most mass incidents of racial violence took the form of white-led
pogroms55 that indiscriminately targeted African Americans and their
neighborhoods. These events took place in Wilmington, North Carolina (1898);
Atlanta, Georgia (1906); Elaine, Arkansas, (1919); Omaha, Nebraska (1919);
Tulsa, Oklahoma (1921); and Rosewood, Florida (1923). They generally involved
enforcing the white-supremacist hierarchy, and often were spurred by “rape
rumors [of Black men sexually assaulting white women or girls],56” a theme also
common to Southern lynchings.57 While African Americans fought back, they
generally did not employ a similar level of violence in defending themselves that
whites used in attacking them (except for Washington, D.C. in 1919). Black
groups feared this would only lead to tougher white reprisals.58 In the post 1943

52

While incidents like this continue to the present day, this chapter stops just before the 1967
Buffalo Race Riot, as this will be addressed in the chapter that follows.
53
Marilynn S. Johnson, “Gender, Race, and Rumors: Re-Examining the 1943 Race Riots,” Gender
& History 10, no. 2 (August 1998): pp. 252-277, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0424.00099, 259. &
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Isabel Wilkerson, The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America's Great Migration
(Vintage Books, 2011), 131.
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Johnson, 252.
56
Ibid., 259.
57
Amy Louise Wood, “The Spectacle of Lynching: Rituals of White Supremacy in the Jim Crow
South,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 77, no. 3-4 (September 2018): pp. 757788, https://doi.org/10.1111/ajes.12249, 765.
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era, a new form of Black urban rebellion “reflected the increasing isolation of the
post-war ghetto as well as the changing dynamics of American racism, a racism
that had become more subtle, impersonal, and bureaucratic.”59 White pogroms
had given way to ghetto-based Black Uprisings.
Between 1910 and 1940, millions of Black migrants journeyed north in
search of economic, social, and political freedom from the entrenched racial caste
system of the South. Most made their way to cities such as Chicago, Illinois,
Newark, New Jersey, New York City, New York, Detroit, Michigan, and
Baltimore, Maryland. However, new migrants found hostility from working class
and property-owning Northern whites, many of whom who looked upon them as
racially inferior. Whites resented the prospect of sharing urban public spaces with
new migrants, who they feared as jobs competition.60
As this migration continued throughout the Great Depression, Northern
urban whites and government policymakers intensified their opposition to the
presence of the new arrivals. On a local level, white property owners formed
racial covenants (collective promises to refuse to rent or sell property to African
Americans) to prevent Black families from living outside designated areas. This
process proved so successful that, for example, on the eve of the Detroit Uprising,
“80%”61 of the metropolis “outside the inner-city was subject to racial
convents.”62 The creation of the Federal Homeowners Loan Corporation in 1933
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and the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) in 1934 codified this discrimination
“against African Americans, by granting low-interest loans and mortgages”63
almost exclusively to white city-dwellers.64 Numerous “passages in FHA
underwriting manuals and publications that have been largely overlooked by
historians called unequivocally for the containment of African Americans in
designated residential neighborhoods as part of a broader effort to establish stable,
homogenous communities of white homeowners.”65 The effects of this
institutionalized discrimination would only compound with time.
African Americans further faced pervasive economic discrimination,
through depressed wages, higher unemployment rates, and inflated commodity
prices alongside violent harassment from majority-white police forces. Even
though life had improved upon moving north, many African Americans still lived
in poverty, surrounded by whites who enjoyed higher living standards, greater
employment, and better housing. After 1941, migration increased further, as the
federally desegregated defense industry needed vast labor inputs to operate
enormous northern war factories. By 1943, African American frustrations boiled
to such a point, particularly in Harlem and Detroit, that one sociologist, writing in
1971, could find:
Blacks in both cities were experiencing the paradoxical combination of
rising expectations and gnawing helplessness. Economically, socially,
politically, the Black race was improving its position in American society,
but the individual Black felt helpless to speed his own movement toward
63
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full and equal participation in the good things of American life. Even
when he had the money, he found that he could not buy the standard of
living that the white man enjoyed. He was hemmed in by prohibitions and
discrimination.66
The summer of 1943 represented a climax of this tension in violent revolt, as well
as a turning point in the history of mass racial violence.
On June 20, 1943, a violent altercation between Black and white
teenagers, on an island adjacent to Detroit, led to multi-day inter-ethnic brawls,
looting, and destruction. Over the course of three days, 43 died, hundreds were
injured and nearly 2,000 arrested. However, during the destruction, for the first
time in a post-Civil War incident of mass racial violence, “Blacks fought back as
earnestly as the whites...[and]...began attacking and looting perceived symbols of
exploitation, the stores and laundries run by whites and other outsiders that blacks
felt were cheating them.”67
One month later, a similar uprising transpired in New York City.
Following a negative interaction between two Black Harlemites and a white
police officer, an urban revolt erupted on August 1 and 2. Uniquely, the incident
had “almost total absence of black-white clashes”68 Historian Diana Lestz finds
that, rather than white persons, African American participants “aimed [their
destructive energies] towards white-owned property. These were not random acts
perpetrated by thugs or misguided youths; rather, the rioters represented the
perception of oppression shared by a much larger portion of the Harlem
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population.”69 The focus of the riot proved to be focused on symbols of
exploitation not on the exploiters themselves.
August 2, 1943, marked the start of a momentous shift in incidents of
mass racial violence. These occurrences, for the most part, morphed from the
“white-led”70 pogroms “of the early twentieth century”71 into “the black-led
ghetto revolts of the latter half of the century.”72 Rather than rumors of rape or
sexual assault, police brutality “emerged as the single most important rumor
theme in …[future] riots.”73 Unlike previous white-led bouts of racial violence,
post 1943 Black rebellions, had more deliberate aims and specific targets, such as
the nighttime destruction of exploitative white-owned ghetto stores. Before 1943,
police officers played a minor role in incidents of racial violence, as white
vigilantes assumed the primary role of doling out violence. After 1943, police
officers became the primary force against the participants. One telling discovery
attests to this, uncovered by the NAACP’s own investigation of the events in
Detroit, “of twenty-five Blacks killed, seventeen died at the hands of the
police.”74
However, no major racial conflagrations, nothing approaching Detroit or
Harlem, occurred for the next twenty-one years, in the North or the West, until the
1964 Harlem Race Uprising. Most of the racial violence in this “‘middle period’
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was instigated by whites,”75 and took the form of small-scale brawls over public
spaces. While these incidents occurred in northern cities since the beginning of
the Great Migration, a lack of mass acts of racial violence in the region during
these twenty-one years put them in the historical spotlight. Public pools, skating
rinks, and amusement parks turned into sites of boiling tension between African
Americans challenging de facto segregation and whites determined to maintain
their grip over public accommodations. For example, cities such as Cincinnati and
Cleveland, Ohio, and York, Pennsylvania, all experienced violent clashes.76
Buffalo experienced violence as well. Thirteen years before the Uprising,
Black Buffalonians violently responded to recreation discrimination in the Crystal
Beach Riot. In May 1956, Black and white teenagers fought on a Lake Erie
passenger excursion vessel, the Canadiana. This small-scale violence was
precipitated by several uniformed off-duty soldiers using racial epithets towards
African Americans, expressing hostility to them as they enjoyed a public leisure
space. In response, several young Black men hurled one of the soldiers off the
Canadiana, and brawls quickly followed.
Several factors, both within and outside African American urban spaces,
explain why mass racial rebellions arose again in 1964. The Civil Rights gains
that nominally desegregated schools, integrated buses, and outlawed all forms of
de jure Jim Crow by 1965, did not meaningfully impact most northern, urban
African Americans. Despite Civil Rights’ activists attempts, in the North,
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“...separate and inferior schools [for Blacks], slum housing, and policy hostility
proved invulnerable to direct attack.”77 In 1967, economist Vivian Henderson
explained to the Kerner Commission that
No one can deny that all Negroes have benefited from civil rights laws and
desegregation in public life in one way or another. The fact is, however,
that the masses of Negros have not experienced tangible benefits in a
significant way. This is so in education and housing. It is critically so in
the area of jobs and economic security. Expectations of Negro masses for
equal job opportunity programs have fallen far short of fulfillment.78
Growing frustration, and the authorities’ unwillingness to address their
grievances, led many in northern ghettoes to believe only violence could make
others understand their plight.
Forces beyond the control of African American communities made life
increasingly fraught between 1943 and 1964. Chief among these were continued
housing discrimination of the FHA, urban renewal projects, and white flight. By
1964, the FHA had been in effect for some three decades and continued
preventing urban Blacks from acquiring credit. The FHA “resist[ed] reforms
thrust upon it by the Civil Rights Movement in the late 1940s and 1950s...
disavow[ing] any responsibility for discriminatory decisions made in the private
market while persisting in supporting segregationist activity.”79 Additionally,
federally-subsidized urban renewal programs, designed for highway building and
“slum clearance,” had led to massive displacement of poor people of color
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throughout America’s cities, destroying Black businesses and uprooting middleclass neighborhoods.
White flight accelerated as the building of large highways and the cheap
FHA loan issuances led to an outpouring of wealth from inner cities. The 1960s
witnessed “white populations of central cities...[decline] by 9.6% [overall, and]
...in the Northeast...[by]... 6.2%.”80 Millions of white Americans, fearing the
possibility of integrated schools, living close to African Americans, and rising
crime, fled to newly built suburbia. This process only increased the spatial and
economic segregation of Black city dwellers.
Nevertheless, the migration of African Americans into Northern cities
continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s—perhaps more a testament to the
barbarity of Jim Crow south than northern benevolence. In smaller, so-called
secondary cities (those that did not constitute the largest population center or most
economically prosperous metropolis in each state), African American populations
rose in tens of thousands. Further, Black birthrates soared between 1940 and
1960. While the “white population rose 34.0 percent,”81 the African American
“population rose 46.6 percent.”82 From 1960 to 1966, the Black population grew
at a rate of nearly two to one compared to Caucasians.83 Thus, by 1964, Northern
ghettoes were filled with young African Americans, who throughout the 1960s
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had witnessed grinding poverty, failed promises of the Civil Rights Movement,
and racist duplicities resulting from an often-apathetic federal government.
Unlike the 1943 rebellions, uprisings erupted in both large and small
cities. Smaller cities with less than three hundred thousand residents, such as
York, Pennsylvania; New Brunswick, New Jersey; Cambridge, Massachusetts;
and Dayton, Ohio all experienced ghetto revolts. While most of the violence and
property damage between 1964 and 1967 came from violence in primary urban
centers—Newark, Detroit, Watts—incidents in these secondary cities have
recently come under historical re-examination. Common across all these
rebellions “Black people threw rocks and bottles at police, shot at them with
rifles, smashed the windows of businesses and institutions [such as police
stations], and plundered local stores.”84 The root of this violence proved political,
not hedonistic opportunism.
Much of American historiography has long misinterpreted many Black
uprisings of the 1960s as frustrated, explosions rather than truly organized
rebellions. For years, both politicians espousing a law-and-order philosophy and
prominent conservative historians such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan, John A.
McCone, Fred Siegel, and Stephen Thernstrom have argued that “it was the
riffraff of the ghetto who fueled the violence...the criminals, the young, the
unskilled, and the jobless. They burned and looted seeking momentary thrills as a
break from their tedious lives.”85 According to this interpretation, short-sighted,
opportunistic criminality lay at the root of these incidents, not an organized,
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political expression of resistance. However, such an analysis proves far too
simplistic, as Elizabeth Hinton has commented:
It can be difficult to imagine the [Black] children and teenagers who threw
rocks at police or who looted local businesses as political actors, and this
bias had influenced the writing of the history of this era...This is, in part,
because there were few manifestos or dramatic claims about intentions,
from the rebels. But collective action should be understood as political if it
is intended to shape the interests of the government. As much as
nonviolent direct action, with its august lineage going back to Gandhi and
others, violent rebellion offered a means for people of color to express
collective solidarity in the face of exploitation, political exclusion, and
criminalization. Both traditions continue to ground movements for racial
justice. Yet the violent conditions that have shaped Black experience have
made violent responses and the politics that fueled them inevitable.86
These uprisings sought for Blacks greater inclusion within existing political and
economic institutions, access to city services, employment, the end of
discriminatory business practices and the driving out of neighborhoods of highly
militarized, omnipresent police forces. This is more clearly evident in smaller
cities where participants conducted more coordinated actions and displayed a
greater element of internal organization. However, most Civil Rights historians,
and even “scholars and activists who focus on resistance to systematic racism
have been reluctant to take seriously the political nature of Black rebellions.”87
One of the most important intensive studies of the political and coordinated nature
of urban uprisings was the previously analyzed “Harvest of American Racism:
The Political Meaning of Violence in the Summer of 1967.” Ironically, this
paramount study was suppressed for fifty years by the commissioners of the
famed Kerner Report.
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The “Harvest” report found the most violent upheavals (in Watts, Detroit,
and Newark) occurred in two distinct phases. First, sparked by an inciting incident
of a particularly brutal encounter between an African American and a white police
officer, “widespread and aggressive action by ghetto Negros…overwhelm[s] the
police the first phase and evoke[s] a harsh retaliatory response in the second.”88 In
this “retaliatory response,”89 law enforcement employed a disproportionate level
of violence when “re-establish[ing] police authority, and aveng[ing] police
honor.”90 These officers became increasingly militarized (armed with M4
Carbines, tear gas, and three-foot batons91) throughout the 1960s, which
predictably caused immense loss of life and destruction. However, while actions
within the largest rebellions had politicized actions, the actual uprisings
themselves had little to no overall organization. As the “Harvest” report
contended, uprisings in Watts, Newark and Detroit had a political element to
them, but the sheer “massive[ness]”92 meant no one could control them. These
uprisings proved too large for any wide-spread coordination between participants.
Hundreds of incidents in smaller cities, however, reveal clear overtones, such as
coordination between participants about hitting specific stores, issuance of
demands, or organizing rebels into groups to carry out destruction.
The “Harvest” report added the perspective that the hundreds of other
more minor rebellions differed from the famous and fewer largest ones. Many of
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these smaller revolts not only had the political actions of “attacking symbols of
white American society, authority, and property in Negro neighborhoods,”93 but a
high degree of internal coherence, as well as planning and coordination. For
example, in Plainfield in 1967, following school protests, “ghetto
youths…throughout the disorders…showed a high degree of organization,
leadership, rationality, and collective purpose. They alternated violence with
meetings [with city officials] and showed a willingness to bargain and negotiate
with authorities when they thought it would do them good.”94 Demands ranged
from greater access to employment to more recreational facilities in Black
neighborhoods.
Both teenagers and respected community leaders “used both the threat and
reality of collective violence to advocate for structural change.”95 1966 Cincinnati
witnessed “three straight days [of] selective violence by youths in the
evening...followed by a lull during daylight hours.”96 During the day, the adult
Black leadership made demands of the city government in an apparent “political
attempt to exploit the disorder to achieve victories on issues that both preceded
the violence and evolved into it.”97 A similar, but far more direct threat of
violence emerged in Cairo, Illinois in the summer of 1967. In an effort to leverage
violence to achieve economic aims, local Civil Rights organizers and leaders
Charles Koen and John Brantley, whom the Black community had selected as
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representatives, told Mayor Lee Stenzel and other white city officials they had
“72 hours to meet”98 their demands of better economic and employment treatment
of African Americans or “Cairo will look like Rome burning down.”99 When
officials did not redress their grievances meaningfully, the city burned for three
days, particularly white-owned businesses.
The Black uprisings of 1964-1967 displayed a wide array of motives and a
great deal of chaos and destruction. However, like 1943, contemporary
scholarship cannot ignore the internally organized nature of the many acts of
destruction. Black urban Uprisings of 1943 forever changed the general nature of
mass racial violence and foreshadowed the ghetto revolts of 1964 to 1967:
massively chaotic incidents with Black actors committing politicized actions
within them, through attacks on police officers and breaking windows of
exploitative white-owned ghetto bushiness. In this latter period, some smallerscale rebellions emerge as internally coordinated organized political ventures.
East Buffalo, in the summer of 1967, would come to resemble this latter
occurrence.
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Chapter Two: Black Students & Buffalo Public Schools
From newspaper arrest reports100 to post-Uprising testimony,101 the
historical record affirms that Black public-school students played an outsized role
in the June 26 to July 1, 1967, Buffalo Uprising. Decades before 1967, Black
students continuously faced a school system (the Buffalo Public School System,
also known as the BPSS) that sought to reinforce their status as second-class
citizens. White administrators enacted numerous policies to “ensure the...isolation
of...Black children in Buffalo’s schools,”102 confining them to an inferior
education with inadequate resources. These policies produced, by 1967, the fourth
most segregated school system north of the Mason-Dixon line.103 The BPSS
packed Black students into a handful of dilapidated buildings “with the least
experienced teachers.”104 While the policymakers who forged this educational
apartheid remained largely invisible to African American pupils, “the nearly allwhite teaching staff”105 teaching staff did not. These teachers treated their Black
students abusively and neglectfully that they became the embodiment of white
oppression in their pupils’ eyes.
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Unsurprisingly, the first student-led protests against the school-system
centered on the hostility of white teachers towards Black pupils. The walkouts
and boycotts of 1966 would, in 1967, be replaced by violent revolts. In the final
weeks of the 1966-1967 school year, African American students physically
attacked their instructors with their fists, beating their white teachers and
damaging their parked vehicles by letting the air out of their tires. Thus,
coordinated, politicized protest, both peaceful and violent coalesced in public
school systems as Black pupils sought to strike back against the most obvious
symbol of white authority. These incidents, particularly those in the last weeks of
the 1966-1967 school year, prefaced the Uprising to come, in which hundreds of
students would participate.
Before delving further, it is important to understand the rapid demographic
shifts the city underwent between 1940 and 1970. Over those thirty years,
Buffalo’s Black population rose from eighteen thousand106 to ninety-four
thousand two hundred and thirty-nine.107 A continuous stream of southern
migrants, coupled with a suburban-bound outflux of whites, dramatically altered
the city’s racial composition. In three short decades, Black Buffalonians went
from comprising one in thirty-three city-dwellers (3.1%)108 to one in five
(20.1%),109 a four hundred-thirty-three percent increase. An even larger percent
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increase occurred among student-age African Americans. From 1940 to1965,
“non-white persons” (99.6% of these people were Black110) aged fourteen and
under increased five hundred- eighty-six percent,111 from 4,604 to 27,400. This
dramatic demographic change could have led to more diversified classrooms, as
well as a more equitable distribution of resources across racial lines. However,
because of the Board of Education’s actions, the opposite occurred. BPSS
conditions declined, particularly from 1954 onwards, due to the intentional
segregationist policies made by the Board, whose campaign sought to contain
Buffalo’s skyrocketing number of Black students into a handful of schools
According to District Judge John Thomas Curtin and historian Neil Kraus,
the Board of Education’s campaign to segregate the BPSS began in 1954. Over
several years, the Board manipulated mandatory and optional school attendance
zones, redirected predominantly Black junior high schools to feed into East High
School, and set up a discriminatory foreign language transfer system. This last
system acted as
an optional attendance zone policy whereby students living in geographic
areas designated optional had a choice about where to attend school.
While on the surface the optional attendance policy was not necessarily a
means of segregating the school system, the populations of the numerous
optional in the BPSS were disproportionately white. This of course gave
the white student population more choices about where to attend school,
while also locking the African American community into attending certain
schools.112
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These policies forced Black students into select schools while permitting whites,
afraid of rising crime on the East Side ghetto and bigotedly wanting to avoid their
children encountering Black students,113 to opt out of attending them. For
instance, in “effectively designating”114 East as “Buffalo’s ‘Negro High
School,’”115 city officials selected two different high schools, Kensington and
South Park to be “entirely white.”116 This process repeated itself over the next
several years and as historian Joseph Gerald Mosley decisively argues,
In moving the whites and Blacks into their respective...[schools]...the
Board [of Education] sent a clear message that the whites would attend the
better schools...that employed the more experienced teachers, [and] that
were housed in updated facilities. On the other hand, the Blacks were sent
to the worst schools, that provided them with a compensatory curriculum,
that had the least experienced teachers, that were housed in buildings that
were old and maintenance deferred.117
These policies achieved segregation of BPSS in a matter of decades. For instance,
in 1953, the student body of East High School was overwhelmingly white118 with
a small number of Black pupils. Seventeen years later, despite the neighborhood
around East being “40 percent white,”119 some “99 percent”120 of the student body
was African American.
By the time of the Uprising, BPSS had become, for Black students, a
hyper-segregated apartheid. That year, 1967, the United States Civil Rights
Commission identified the BPSS “as the fourth most segregated school system in
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the North.”121 Of the system’s ninety-six K-12 schools, “67...enrolled student
populations that were either 80-100% majority or 80-100% minority. Twenty of
the schools had a student enrollment that was at least ninety percent black while
twenty-nine schools had a white student enrolment of at least 90%”122 These 20
Black-majority schools severely lagged far behind their white counterparts. Even
in a city that spent far less per student than the New York State average, majority
Black schools received significantly less funding than white ones.123
Compared to schools such as South Park and Kensington, segregated
African American ones suffered from “grave problems...with the facilities,
equipment, and supplies...Science equipment was obsolete and in cramped
quarters. Field trips were nonexistent.”124 No African American-majority schools
offered any electives in Black history, nor “were there any materials or methods
which respected ghetto-life”125 even though Buffalo schools celebrated ethnic
holidays such as St. Patrick’s Day. In 1967, Gardell Morehead, a sixteen-year-old
Black student and vice-president of the local Youth Council of the Buffalo
NAACP frustratedly explained to New York Times reporters that “They [the
schools] make us celebrate St. Patrick’s Day for three days here. I learned a lot of
Irish folk songs and nothing about my own Negro past.”126 In-school job training
programs either did not exist or proved largely inadequate, and poor Black
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students felt keenly aware of this: “we’re tired of going to [these] schools”127 one
sixteen-year-old student told an interviewer after the Uprising. “You go to a get a
job and you’re not qualified for a job...why? Because of this low-quality
education.”128 Insufficient facilities, underfunding, a lack of electives in Black
history and cultural life, terrible job-training programs, and hyper-segregation
contributed to a shocking dropout rate of twenty-four percent, some seventeen
percent higher than the city-wide average.129 Thus, the result of any policy of
segregation, de-facto, or de-jure, is a stultifying isolation, enforced daily by
majority-white teachers.
Even in her nineties, Mrs. Ruth Kennedy can still recall the racist, violent
experience of the BPSS. Long before the Board of Education embarked upon its
campaign to segregate Buffalo’s public schools, Black students still acutely
suffered at the hands of the teaching staff. After entering Public School #6 in
September 1935, Ruth Kennedy recalls, “When I look back, and even when I was
going through [the BPSS], it was not very encouraging. Teachers would not
inspire you...I had thought at one time I had wanted to be a writer. I got to the
place where I would not share my feelings [in the classroom].”130 Beyond their
insensitivity to the aspirations of Black students, white staff employed
disproportionate physical violence when disciplining African American pupils.
Even in an era of schoolroom corporal punishment, Ruth Kennedy distinctly
remembers the psychological and physical brutality she and others endured.
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“Teachers...did horrible things, especially to males, they zeroed in on them.”131
Even after eight decades beyond graduating in 1946, Mrs. Kennedy would not, or
could not describe what exactly “zeroed in” or “horrible things” entailed, or under
what circumstance they occurred. Later interviewees would elaborate upon this,
often in frightening detail.
Another interviewee, Guy Cameron, a student of the late forties and early
fifties, would explain that the violence Mrs. Kennedy described was “Corporal
punishment. [White teachers] would hit students, even disproportionate for that
time, and a lot of them used paddles.” Mr. Cameron recounts, this occurred
exclusively in Black majority-schools. It did not happen to him in the majority
white Public School #74, he attended. However, he knew it was so pervasive in
Black majority schools that “it was a [known] issue,” in the larger African
American community.
Brutalization of Black students by white teachers continued throughout the
1960s and into the 1970s. In a 1971 report drawn up by Buffalo’s Black United
Front, the documents’ authors described the general maltreatment and potential
violence white teachers menaced Black students with every day. The
authors issued a clarion call for a black student walk out on October 8th,
1971. This call was not only inspired by the lack of black representation in
schools but because of the mental abuse and potential physical threat
posed by so called educators: ‘…intimidation of black students by white
teachers, some of whom even bring guns to school, and the preferential
treatment of white students receive in the schools over the black
students.’132

131

Ibid.
Domonique Griffin “They Were Never Silent, You Just Weren't Listening: Buffalo's Black
Activists in the Age of Urban Renewal” (2017), 64.

132

41
Despite being the most brutal tension builder between teachers and students,
direct violence did not prove the only one.
Miscommunication, according to Mr. Cameron, proved another, albeit
lesser, source of tension between Black students and their white teachers. Even
the best-intentioned teachers had, in Mr. Cameron’s words, “very little knowledge
of Black history, Black culture, and Black cultural dynamics.”133 His teachers
routinely talked to him and other African American “students in a way that was
derogatory, even in a lot of instances it wasn’t meant to be that way.”134 The
source of this treatment, he contends, “was the perception of a lot of whites that
Blacks were illiterate. This goes back to the foundational planks of racism in the
country... [the belief that] ...Blacks are childlike, illiterate, always thinking of
getting around certain things without doing anything, [and] lazy.”135 However,
this prejudice often proved less oblique. In a 1997 interview, Frank Mesiah, a
student in the 1940s, recalled how white staff and teachers referred to Black-filled
school buses as “nigger freight trains.”136
The Board of Education even sought to keep the number of minority staff
artificially low,137 filling Black schools with mostly white educators, particularly
those with the least teaching experience.138 The Board deliberately underemployed a pool of qualified Black staff and as a result “even schools with very
high percentages of African American students, in the 80 percent to 90 percent
133
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range or higher, only had a small number of black teachers....Most African
American students [of the period between 1940-1970] would not have had any
black teachers.”139 Thus, at best, African American students learned from
culturally uninformed, inexperienced, racially insensitive teachers who lived far
from the decaying ghettoes in which they taught.140 At worst, Black students had
to endure violently racist instructors who felt total apathy toward the well-being
of their pupils. Predictably, when protests arose across the school district, they
centered on the conflict between white teachers and Black pupils.
The first organized, non-violent, African American student protest of the
BPSS occurred in the spring of 1966. In the area of Lackawanna, a neighborhood
located in the southern extreme of the Buffalo Niagara-Falls Metropolitian Area, a
group of African American students staged a walkout during school hours. The
high school protest centered on Black students’ negative perceptions of their
nearly-all white teaching staff. One student insurgent angrily told a Besag
interviewer after the Buffalo Uprising, “last year we had a boycott of the school...
[but the schoolteachers] just forgot it.”141 Nothing appears to have changed due to
this “boycott” and the protest receiving no press coverage.
Another peaceful demonstration occurred sometime during the 1966-1967
school year. This incident, most likely occurring at East High School—by “1966
three-fifths of Buffalo’s Black high school students attended East High”142—
became the first student-led protest in the city’s East Side ghetto. After the
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Uprising, one student insurgent explained to a Besag interviewer, “I felt that
rioting was doing the right thing because we boycotted the school. We walked out
of there because we were discriminated against and we went back.”143 The phrase
“we were discriminated against” suggests that the protest occurred against racist
actors on school grounds, demonstrating this protest arose because of abusive
treatment by white staff. Like Lackawanna, there are few to no records
mentioning this incident either, implying neither protest did anything to remedy
the situation. The only source mentioning the protest comes from that a local
community organization’s (“The Friendship House”) “Progress Report.” This
document describes a winter protest in which “Negro High School students
boycotted school in their attempt to gain equal attention and concern from the
teachers and their principal.”144 However, the report mentions no resolution to the
conflict, implying that the protest did little to change conditions. Thus, these two
incidents further demonstrate that Black students viewed their public schools as
discriminatory institutions meriting of organized, peaceful, protest. African
American students clearly organized their protest to challenge the BPSS power
structure.
As the 1966-1967 school year ended, the nature of Black protest radically
changed. In these first weeks of June, African American students violently
asserted their discontent, targeting the clearest agents of oppression in their
schools—teachers. Buffalo School Superintendent Joseph Manch, who had
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presided over the BPSS’s ninety-six schools since 1957, told journalists on June
29 that during “the last few days of classes...signs of deep unrest were beginning
to show...students did things they had never done before—attacked teachers, cars,
let air out of tires and stoned teachers with whom they had good relations.”145
Indicative of their aims, these pupils did not destroy school property or assault
fellow students. Rather, they struck out against their educators who they had come
to view as agents of white oppression.
Like the Uprising to come146 and others in 1967,147 Black students chose
specific targets in their violent June protests. The specificity of the targets, the
teachers, and their property, reveals a politically coherent pattern to these acts of
violence. These represented an assault on white oppressors and the vehicles they
used to transport themselves out of the ghetto neighborhoods they taught in, and,
for many, back to the suburbs from which the white power structures and
restrictive housing covenants had excluded their students. The white educators
who neither lived near their ghetto-bound students nor truly understood the
problems facing them became targets of coordinated violence.
The proximity of public-school graduations (June 22 – June 24)148 and the
Uprising’s onset (June 26) does not prove historically surprising. As scholar
Elizabeth Hinton has persuasively shown:
...schools [in the late 1960s and early 1970s] were sites of Black
insurgency...and of rebellions that began on school grounds before spreading
145
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into the streets...many cases of rebellion started with young people protesting
as students and organizing for racial justice within their schools...[In] many
American cities, student-led rebellions spilled over into the larger community
and involved widespread violence. That this violence arose from within the
public school system suggests that these rebellions were not outbursts of
criminality but reactions to unequal educational and socioeconomic
conditions.149
With graduation and the end of school between June 22nd and 24th, Black
students, were no longer faced with harassment and ill-treatment by white
teachers, white-run schools, and poor education. They organized and pointed their
politicized, semi-coordinated violence at a new target: the exploitative economic
structures of the East Side Buffalo Ghetto, the same stores that refused them
summer employment, which was a necessity for poor, out-of-school students.
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Chapter Three: The Uprising’s Targets
Like other Black uprisings of the 1960s, Black Buffalonians “chose their
targets carefully and had just two: the police and shopkeepers”150 businesses.
Analyzing this requires an understanding of the economic and law enforcement
institutions which oppressed Black students. Such an analysis demonstrates why
insurgent students selected East Side white-owned stores and the officers of the
Buffalo Police Department (BPD) for their pre-planned, coordinated violence.
For Buffalo’s mostly poor151 Black students, the end of the school year
presented them with a stark reality: either find summer employment and have the
chance to pay for the ghetto’s overpriced152 food, clothing, and school materials,
or live an impoverished, isolated existence idling in overcrowded public housing
units and on over-policed streets. “It’s absolutely necessary for some people,
especially teenagers, younger people, to have jobs,” one Black student bitterly
explained to a SUNY Buffalo researcher discussion group in July of 1967 “This is
really the whole thing. Give youths jobs so that if they can’t get the help from
their parents, they can help themselves. All I want is a job so I can have enough,
so I can get everything that I need to be properly equipped [sic]. Then I can go
into these books. You know, you don’t want to go into a classroom, and you don’t
want to wear out no book the principal’s paying for [sic].”153 By the end of the
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1966-1967 school year, it had become apparent that summer jobs, mainly given
by white business owners, would not be forthcoming.
Black business owners, who may have been more amenable to the
problems of unemployed, dark-skinned students, could offer far fewer jobs due to
a two decades-long municipal policy that displaced and destroyed Black
businesses. During the 1950s, the Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority and
Buffalo Common Council (the city’s governing body) embarked upon several
urban development programs, such as the construction of the Kensington
Expressway, that physically and financially ripped apart the predominately
African American East Side.154 One such development “program to raze
dilapidated neighborhoods and sell the land to private developers”155 proved
especially disastrous for Black Buffalo’s economy. Beginning in 1956, an “allwhite redevelopment board appointed by the city’s Common Council”156
demolished “thirty-six blocks in the [predominantly Black] Ellicott district.”157 In
the end, the project ruinously displaced “more than two hundred and fifty
businesses that had formed the economic backbone of the Black community,”158
significantly decreasing the financial power of Black Buffalonians. By June 1967,
fewer businesses on the East Side were owned and operated by its Black residents
because of this project.
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At the same time, many of Buffalo’s firms, large and small, refused to hire
young African Americans because of their race. In a 1971 court case, United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, one of the city’s last manufacturing giants
“admitted [to] discrimination against Negroes in most of its employment
practice.”159 Specifically regarding summer employment, the court discovered
that during “the summer of 1966, 26 Negroes out of 1100 summer employees
were hired. In 1967, [only] 12 out of 478,”160 were hired. Beyond this, no Black
summer applicant had ever made Bethlehem Steel’s internal “‘Golden List,’”161
which:
...contained the names of a selected group of prospective summer
employees who were given preferential treatment including assurance of a
job, rapid processing, and favorable job assignment. The employment
applications of such persons were designated with the symbol ‘AU’ [the
chemical symbol for Gold]. No Negro has ever been on the ‘Golden
List.’162
Discriminatory hiring practices like this persisted in the heart of the East Side
Ghetto as well. After speaking with a white business-owner on July 20, 1967,
Uprising researcher Cheryl Lumpkin scribbled beneath the interview transcript:
“One of the particular things I noticed in this shop was the fact that this man,
although he is in the heart of the Negro community, he employs no Negroes at the
present time in his shop. There are other employees besides himself and his wife
as he mentioned.”163 Beyond this, there are even accounts of the children of
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white-business owners telling young Blacks their parents would not hire them.
One Black student, a participant in the Uprising, who admitted to breaking the
windows of white-owned businesses, told interviewers matter-of-factly: “Well,
we broke them because Georgie [an older white man] told us that his son [a white
business owner] said that he wasn’t going to hire any colored people, but the day
before we came to the conclusion that we wasn’t [sic] going to riot no more, we
was [sic] going to break his window that day.”164 Many of the firms that could
have offered summer employment for Black students refused to hire them, or only
offered insubstantial numbers of hours to meet their employment needs.
Unsurprisingly, during the Uprising, Black participants most prominent demand
proved to be summer employment. However, their secondary target proved
equally insidious: the BPD.
When trying to understand why Uprising participants targeted police, a
better question might be to examine why police violently targeted African
Americans. As Elizabeth Hinton masterfully demonstrated, Black rebellions of
the 1960s and ‘70s occurred partly in response to police brutality, not the other
way around. For example, a precipitating incident occurred on the evening of June
26, 1967, when a fight arose between two Black youths playing basketball. A
white police officer attempted to break up the fight with unnecessary brutality—
by cracking both boys over the head with a baton, and then proceeding to beat and
arrest the boys’ frightened mothers after they tried to intervene. This episode
raises several questions: Why was a police officer present at such a juvenile
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altercation? Why did the officers and others act with such brutality? Why was the
level of trust between Buffalo Police Officers and Black residents so low that
such an incident like this could occur?
To begin with, the presence of police officers at an argument between
teenagers on a public basketball court reflects the unprecedented shift American
policing underwent in the 1960s. The long, violent, and complicated relationship
between law enforcement and African Americans forever changed during this
period. Beginning in 1965, during President Johnson’s administration (19631969), the federal government looked to forge a link between “the fighting of
crime and the fighting of urban inequality,”165 providing massive funding for local
police departments in a way never seen before in American history. With the
uprisings of Harlem and Watts fresh in mind, Congress nearly unanimously
passed the Law Enforcement Assistance Act (LEAA) in September of 1965. This
legislation took American policing in an unprecedented direction, establishing the
first “direct funding channels between the federal government and the criminal
justice system.”166 In addition to changing the financial relationship between the
federal government and local police departments, the Johnson administration
philosophically re-conceptualized what an urban police officer ought to be. The
President proposed that urban police officers should act as frontline soldiers, “just
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as the man does in the rice paddies of Vietnam to protect freedom,” 167reframing
them as soldiers conducting counter-insurgency operations. Officers became ever
more accustomed to “preventive, rather than solely reactive, policing
approaches,”168 that assumed “the occupation, patrol, and surveillance of highrisk, low-income neighborhoods of color”169 they deemed necessary to prevent
urban unrest and crime.
The LEAA established the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance
(OLEA), which allocated millions of dollars in funding towards hiring more
police officers to patrol low-income urban centers, militarizing existing police
departments, and emphasizing a greater degree of surveillance and direct
intervention while on the beat in Black neighborhoods. Between its first and fifth
year of directly funding local police departments the “federal allocation for local
police forces”170 underwent a “2,900 percent increase”171 from ten million dollars
in 1965 to three hundred million dollars in 1970.172
As a result, between 1965 and 1967, a multitude of freshly hired,
disproportionately white173 police officers, armed with new riot “control-training,
military grade weapons such as AR-15 and M4 carbines, steel helmets, three-foot
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batons, masks, armored vehicles, two-way radios [and] tear gas”174 set forth upon
a program of unprecedented surveillance coupled with an expansive counterinsurgency-focused mandate to monitor Black, urban neighborhoods. The result
for urban African Americans became the intertwining of everyday life and law
enforcement. As scholar Elizabeth Hinton has poignantly observed, Johnson’s
crime war
encouraged police to make themselves a continuous presence amid
concentrated Black poverty, where criminals and potential criminals were
sure to be discovered. By the late 1960s, [African American] residents
were growing tired of interacting with officers, of coming into contact
with armed agents of the state on a daily basis. Law enforcement saw
everyday contact with Black residents as their duty. The message was
simple: Black people should get used to the police being part of their
pickup basketball games, walks home from work, and family barbeques.175
This explains why a police officer was involved in a juvenile dispute between two
Black youths on a basketball court in Buffalo on June 26, 1967. BPD officers saw
it as their objective to aggressively patrol and become involved in the everyday
affairs of Black Buffalonians. It proved an extension of existing policy, not an
aberration.
The question of why BPD officers so violently treated the Black
residents they ostensibly served can be answered by some combination of the lack
of Black officers, ignorant hired officers to the conditions of the ghetto, and
general racism. The BPD acted as a white-supremacist institution that sought to
prevent African Americans from joining its ranks, preventing those that did from
ever rising to positions of influence. In 1978, Judge Thomas J. Curtin ruled that
the BPD intentionally maintained “a pattern and practice of discrimination against

174
175

Hinton, 11 (2021).
Ibid., 54.

53
blacks…in hiring requirements.”176 This systemic discrimination in hiring officers
of color long predated the 1978 ruling. For example, in 1948, with the city’s
Black population around 36,000, (6.3%177 of the population), the department
employed “only two Black policemen.”178 By 1967, despite a tripling of the citywide Black population to eighteen percent,179 Black officers made up less than
four percent180 of the police department. During the Uprising, the force had one
non-white sergeant and one non-white lieutenant, compared to sixty white
sergeants and ninety-three white lieutenants.181 There was not a single captain or
higher-ranking officer of color.182
The few Buffalo’s Black police officers that had managed to overcome
bigoted hiring requirements had little power to reform the department from
within. White superiors refused to promote them to positions of real influence.
Illustrating this, the sole Black lieutenant in 1967, Floyd Edwards, had been on
the force since 1950, and felt he was never taken seriously by his white
counterparts. Once retired, he “referred to himself in an interview as ‘Mayor
Sedita’s spook at the desk,’ [believing he had only been] promoted because he
was Black,”183 his promotion a form of tokenism to, in the Mayor’s view, appease
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the African-American voting bloc.184 Because of this, before factoring in the
conduct of police, Black Buffalonians saw the BPD as an armed extension of the
white supremacist power-structure that oppressed them educationally,
economically, socially, and politically.
In addition to practicing hiring discrimination, BPD officers constantly
subjected Black Buffalonians to verbal and physical harassment. Even the bestintentioned white officers did not effectively communicate with the African
Americans they policed, often reflecting a failure of police academy training. As a
“42-year-old Negro police officer...[with]...17 years” 185 of experience, likely
Lieutenant Edwards, told an interviewer:
During the rookie’s time in the police academy, a part of his course is
lectures in sociology, and this is given by professors from the University
of Buffalo—white men. Many of the Negroes feel that this would be better
done by a Negro, lecturing to these young police officers who in many
cases come from all white neighborhoods, and in many cases have never
worked around Negroes before. They don’t know what to expect if they
have to go into a ghetto area and I think that a Negro would be better able
to prepare them for what to expect and so forth. Just for instance, perhaps
you have heard along the line, that a Negro doesn’t like to be called ‘boy.’
Now, this is something that the white man does without thinking, and, in
most cases, he doesn’t mean anything derogatory about it, but this is
something that stems from the South. They always refer to the Negro as
‘boy’ down there. If a man is eighty years old, he is still ‘boy.’ If he was
six foot six inches and weighed two hundred and fifty pounds, he is still a
‘boy’ and the Negro doesn’t like this. Now a white officer comes and says,
for instance...right in the heart of the ghetto, and he asks a bunch of
fellows, he wants to ask them to get off the corner. He might say, ‘Hey,
boy, get out of here,’ or ‘Don’t hang around here, boy;’ well, he
immediately—this man, he didn’t intend to do anything. He is doing his
job as he sees it, clearing the corner of loungers, but immediately he has
made some enemies.186
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Beyond this lack of cultural understanding, many BPD officers went beyond
“boy,” referring to African Americans in more explicitly derogatory terms. One
Black youth furiously expressed to researchers that the police routinely referred to
him and others as “black bastards”187 and another recalled that police always
referred to him as “nigger”188 when telling him to get off the street corner.
Beyond this, Besag's research found that officers routinely employed “foul
language, degrading attitudes, and rudeness (especially to women)”189 in
interactions with African Americans.
As in other cities, many rookie officers wanted to create a reputation for
themselves, one that inspired fear and deference in the communities they policed.
On the East Side, this often took the form of roughly manhandling African
Americans, perhaps if they did not follow police orders quickly enough. A Black
youth vividly recounted the police violence he had personally faced and noted that
several “rookies...want a reputation but we not gonna [sic] give them that
chance.”190 This violence went beyond mere manhandling and roughing up,
however. A year before tear gas, shotguns, and blanket arrests of the Uprising, “a
Buffalo police officer was investigated for the shooting death of an unarmed black
youth,”191 which understandably significantly deepened mistrust between the
Black community and local law enforcement. In the crime-ridden areas of
intentionally segregated, artificially impoverished East Buffalo, police
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misconduct and violence such as this proved common even among older officers,
further exacerbating racial tensions.
This tension finally leads to an answer of the third inquiry: why there was
so little trust between the BPD and Black Buffalonians? African Americans
believed the ninety-six percent white BPD enforced the hyper-segregated
economic, political, and spatial order, acting as ubiquitous agents of the white
supremacist power structure. Black students intensely felt this oppression, from
police harassment on street corners outside their homes, and even during
basketball games.192 Thus, in June 1967, the police, after years of violently
brutalizing young African Americans, became targets themselves.
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Chapter Four: Nighttime Destruction & Daytime
Negotiations
In exploring the Uprising of June 26 to July 1, 1967, this chapter considers
the violent nighttime coordinated activities of public-school student insurgents
and secondly of the non-violent daytime actions of these same participants in
conjunction with Black Buffalo’s leaders. Those living through the turmoil
recognized this distinction almost immediately. The Buffalo Evening News
journalist Bill Artis wrote two days into the Uprising: “Night: Turmoil — Day:
Peace...Witness to Looting, Vandalism Finds Quiet Few Hours Later.”193 This
day/night duality of the Uprising motivates the structure of the following chapter.
At night, student insurgents employed various tactics to strike back
calculatingly and violently against the white power structures in Black Buffalo.
Operating in gangs of ten to fifteen persons, student-insurgents burned or
vandalized pre-selected white-owned businesses and attacked police officers. As
the Uprising continued, law enforcement increased their presence, use of lethal
weapons, tear gas and general brutality. Student insurgents in turn responded with
greater violence, a clear demonstration of Elizabeth Hinton's contention that “acts
of Black rebellion always follow[ed] police violence and not the other way
around.”194
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During the day, the same student insurgents and Black Buffalo leaders met
with city officials, aired their grievances, and issued demands, all to leverage their
collective violence into economic and social concessions for Black Buffalonians.
When these demands were not met, either by Mayor Sedita or other city officials,
student insurgents planned and carried out their nighttime assaults. Day and night
activities shared coherence in strategy. From this, one can recognize a novel
conception of the 1967 Buffalo Uprising: it was a student-driven, organized
insurgency, rather than an “emotional outburst to”195 injustice or simply “the
actions of ordinary people who...were forced to take extreme measures to be
heard.”196 Buffalo, between June 26 and July 1, 1967 represented one part of the
greater Black “sustained insurgency”197 occurring all across the nation between
1964 and 1972. This chapter will evaluate the Buffalo Uprising with this added
perspective and illustrate more organized incident than has been previously
understood by scholars who have documented this specific Uprising.
Before delving into the daytime and nighttime complexities of the
Uprising, one must understand there is a lack of documented evidence on this
topic in general. Black rebels across the country left “few manifestos or dramatic
claims about [their] intentions.”198 There exist few if any written statements on
any rebellion’s inner workings. Thus, to understand if inner-organizing principles
existed within the Buffalo Uprising and what they might have been, the evidence
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must be gathered from what participants said at the time, from what they selected
to vandalize or burn, and how they chose to conduct themselves in talks with
influential organizations such as the NAACP and Buffalo City Council.
In publishing the first and perhaps most thorough analysis of the Buffalo
Uprising, Besag and his research assistants interviewed some one hundred and
fifty Buffalonians, demonstrating the outsized influence of students in the
Uprising. In the 1970 volume, The Anatomy of a Riot: Buffalo, 1967, Besag
examined “approximately one-third of the interviews conducted,”199 selecting
them “on the basis of their relevance to the subject.”200 Besag excluded the other
hundred, deeming them “interesting but not entirely germane to the study of the
disturbances.”201 Only six of the 42 interviewees Besag included in Anatomy
admitted to violently participating in the Uprising. Of these six, three told
interviewers they were students (#35202, #36203), two indicated they were not
(#8204, #10205) and one nineteen-year-old was not asked (#18206).
A clearer picture of student involvement emerges when one examines the
other 100 unpublished interviews in the Besag collection at the SUNY Buffalo
Archives. Nine additional interviewees, excluded from Anatomy, admitted to
participating in the Uprising (#21, #101, #103, #104, #105, #107, #108, #109,
#110). Of these, three said or implied they were high school students (#104, #108,
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#109), four were not asked (#21, #103, #105, #110), and two indicate they were
not (#101, #107). It is difficult to ascertain whether the unasked interviewees were
current students at the time they were interviewed. However, a rough estimate
might be gained if one applies the twenty-two to twenty-four percent207 dropout
rate of Buffalo’s East Side High school (known as Buffalo’s “Black High
School”208 where sixty percent209 of Buffalo’s Black students attended, with a
ninety-nine percent210 African American student body) to the whole sample. If we
assume that seventy-six to seventy-eight percent of those between high school
ages of fourteen and nineteen (Buffalo’s Black students sometimes graduated at
nineteen211) who did not specify whether they were high school students, a clear
picture emerges: of fifteen Uprising participants, nine to ten were active students,
and four to five were either dropouts or graduates. By a two-to-one ratio, Uprising
participants were active students, showing they played a prepotent role in the
conflagration to come.
Furthermore, a recently-graduated nineteen-year-old Black male student
admitted to “bust[ing] a lot of windows...of...white-owned businesses.”212 He told
interviewers that those involved “were male, and female, but mainly males
without jobs, [sic] had a poor educational background because of the power
structure in the ghetto.”213 A nineteen-year-old white male similarly told Besag
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interviewers, “Q: Did you notice anything peculiar on the night of the riot in this
neighborhood? A: Well, a lot of the young [Black] boys were missing from the
neighborhood, and nobody knew where they was [sic].”214 His testimony only
further confirms to the large contingent of student-aged, Black youths
participating in the Uprising.
Nighttime:
Throughout the five nights of the Uprising, student insurgents pre-selected
businesses for destruction or vandalism, and deliberately chose to leave others
alone. Their planning occurred sometime before gangs of ten to fifteen set to the
streets. As one fifteen-year-old Black student explained to Besag interviewers,
Uprising participants “were planning on it [violent activity]”215 for some time
beforehand. Another student insurgent explained that the elements of organization
in the June 26 to July 1 Uprising would only increase in a possible future incident.
“Q: Is there a possibility that these people who did participate [in the Uprising]
could get organized and have another riot on a larger scale? A: Well, this was just
a test one because, uh [sic], the real happenings haven’t begun yet.”216 Further,
while the actual planning of targeting specific stores cannot be definitively placed,
nighttime destruction alludes to evidence of clear pre-selection.
Certain stores were designated for vandalism or destruction while others
were not, evidenced by how participants spoke afterward about their actions
during the Uprising. In post Uprising interviews, student insurgents described
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attacking stores they knew frequently exploited African Americans or practiced
hiring discrimination. The same student who admitted to participating in the 1966
Lackawanna school protest told interviewers after the Uprising: “[We broke]
Whitey’s windows. Once in a while we might have made a mistake and broke
colored windows [sic].”217 The student’s use of the word “mistake” highlights
student insurgents’ intentions to damage businesses which they believed had
taken advantage of Black Buffalonians. Further to this point, another insurgent
explained that he and his group destroyed stores based on whether those
businesses “wouldn’t hire Negroes in their stores.”218 However, he also admitted
feeling regret that “by mistake”219 or “by accident”220 some in his gang smashed
the wrong store windows.
Similarly, evidence of planned and targeted violence emerges when
examining businesses student insurgents explicitly chose not to destroy. Uprising
participants refused to touch stores with “soul brother” or “soul-sister” spraypainted on the windows. This Black Power phrase implied a sense of solidarity
with the insurgents.221 They did not touch most Black businesses, like the AfroAsian Bookstore on 1412 Jefferson Avenue, known to distribute anti-war and
Black Power literature.222
There is evidence that student insurgents spared white-owned stores that
did not practice rigid hiring discrimination, revealing a high level of internal
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organization in their selection process. When asked if only white stores “were
hit,” one student insurgent poignantly explained, “No, there was about one or two
Negro stores hit—people that think they’re white, and there wasn’t [sic] some
white stores hit...Q: In other words, stores owners who were fair—they weren’t
bothered? A: Right.”223 A specific example of this comes from Besag Interviewee
#7, a “Caucasian Businessmen in [the] Negro Community.”224 The businessman
owned and operated a child wear shop, a frequent target of student insurgents.225
However, unlike most of the white businesspeople surveyed, this interviewee
“employ[ed] negroes.”226 Likely because of this, the insurgent “children”227 left
his establishment unscathed. This decision, mirroring incidents in other Uprisings,
strongly implies student insurgents pre-selected businesses to destroy. Much like
participants in the Uprising in Englewood, New Jersey, Buffalonian students
displayed clear patterns of organization and discipline in their politicized
violence.
Another strong indicator of the cohesion of student insurgents is revealed
in the way they organized themselves for nighttime violence. Local newspapers,
police officers, and insurgents almost always described operating in groups or
gangs. Insurgents themselves usually referred to their nighttime destruction as
having happened in groups or gangs, or referring to themselves as “we.”228 For
example, one nineteen-year-old Black uprising participant explained to
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interviewers he broke windows with a gang of “about 15 boys,”229 and another, an
eighteen-year-old, responding to “Q: Were you alone or in a group,”230 with, “[I
was] with a group”231 when breaking windows. News media press coverage
confirmed this view that insurgents conducted violence in small groups. As the
Buffalo Evening News reported, “300 to 400 people, roaming in small gangs took
part in the disorders”232 and the New York Times described violence occurring in
“roving bands.”233 However, simply because student insurgents conducted
violence in groups does not necessarily mean these gangs had been organized.
Nevertheless, police testimony from both Black and white officers
suggests that some level of organization existed within student insurgent bands at
night. In a Besag interview with a thirty-seven-year-old white policeman, the
officer distinguished between gangs’ leaders and followers: “Q: Could you tell me
what you saw [during the Uprising]? Specifically, what was happening? A: Well,
you mean as far as kids breaking windows and robbing stores and that type of
thing? Well, I seen [sic] all of that and then the leaders leading [sic] them onto the
street, telling them what to do and things like that.”234 A distinction between
leaders and followers could be observed, even by officers trying to drive the
groups off the streets.
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Another example of this group hierarchy came from Assistant Detective
Chief Floyd Edwards. Interviewed by the Buffalo Courier-Express, Edwards
recalled how on June 27, at 9:30 pm, upon finding a group of Black youths
smashing a window in a “Tavern,” he “‘jumped out of my [patrol] car and
grabbed the ringleader who was involved in the trouble the night before [Monday
night] and who promised there would be no more trouble until charges of police
brutality [on Monday night] had been resolved...His friends took him away from
me.’”235 Edwards reinforces the idea that insurgents organized “ringleaders” and
followers among insurgent groups, illustrating a previously unresearched internal
organization in the politicized violence of the Buffalo Uprising. This structure of
coordinated hierarchy would only become more apparent during daytime hours.
Perhaps more so than at night, the organized nature of the student-driven
insurgency revealed itself during the day. These activities primarily consisted of
meetings with Black leaders and top city officials. At these, student insurgents
elected speakers to address concerns on their behalf and voice their political,
economic, and social grievances frankly. Using the threat of more collective
violence, student insurgents first coerced the traditional Black leadership, who
they viewed as “part of the establishment,”236 and then turned to the municipal
authorities.
Daytime:
The first meeting between student insurgents and a significant
administrative body occurred on the afternoon of June 29, with the NAACP
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leadership. Prominent organization members wanted to determine what could be
done to prevent a fourth night of destruction. They invited youths, many of whom
had participated in the previous nights’ violence,237 to meet at the Buffalo
NAACP chapter headquarters. In the afternoon meeting, about “20 Negro
youths”238 met with “approximately 25 adults,”239 including NAACP chair
Reverend Milton A. Williams. Before meeting, the “youths”240—none of whom
indicated being above the age of eighteen and thus were most likely students—
organized themselves into speakers and elected “a spokesman for the group,”241
eighteen-year-old “Bruce Cosby.”242 The central concern of Cosby’s address was
the need for summer employment and public-school reform.
Speaking to the assembled group, Cosby and others outlined their
grievances and what would happen if nothing changed. Summer “‘jobs would
solve something. That would be a step forward,’”243 the spokesman expressed.
“‘The time for change is right now. The Negro community is just now waking up.
There needs to be a change in education and opportunities.’”244 Interrupting
occasionally, other members of the assembled student insurgents elaborated on
what Cosby’s meant when he said, “‘[things] needs to...change.’”245 One teenager
explained that “‘We feel that the old Negro people were cheated out of their
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education, and we don’t want to be cheated out of ours.’”246 Another sixteen-yearold student insurgent added, “‘Our schools are systemically destroying our young
people.’”247 Yet another demanded an end to “‘token jobs,’”248 and inquired
“‘why can’t we be teachers, lawyers, and doctors?’”249 If the economic inequality
and occupational discrimination was not be remedied, the student insurgents
indicated, collective violence would resume. For example, the sixteen-year-old
student warned that if the discriminatory public-school status quo continued,
“‘there will always be violence.’”250 Another remarked, “‘We want jobs or we’re
gonna tear out [sic],’”251 and an eighteen-year-old, even alluded to resorting to
deadly violence: “‘If we can’t talk it out, we’ll shoot it out.’”252 This final remark
indicates how desperate the student insurgents were for tangible changes. Thus,
the clarity of their demands, the organized nature of their presentation of
grievances through an elected spokesman, and the ages of the “20...youths”253
demonstrate the participants’ deep deliberateness and student status.
After presenting their concerns to the NAACP, student insurgents
continued to demonstrate the internal organization of the Uprising at a meeting
with Mayor Frank A. Sedita. This meeting between the head of the municipal
government and the student insurgents, was brokered by several groups (such as
the NAACP) out of fear of continued violence. Between 5:30 and 6:30pm
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(sundown would not come until 8:58pm254) at the East Side Michigan Avenue
YMCA, about one hundred and fifty youths aired their problems to the Mayor.
They bemoaned the state of dilapidated “housing, poor education, police patrols
and lack of jobs,”255 presenting the Mayor with a list of grievances regarding four
categories—employment, housing, education, and recreation.256 At the end of the
“tense, dramatic, and noisy”257 conference, Sedita, trying to demonstrate his
determination to fix the situation “announced...he would present a list of the
employment grievances to the Chamber of Commerce that same evening.”258
Then, in an act that indicated the genuine alarm of the city-government, Mayor
Frank A. Sedita, who presided over a city of more than one million, and had just
won a second term with over ninety two thousand259 votes two years earlier,
pleaded to have “a week to see what could be done,”260 to attempt to alleviate the
situation.261
It was at this point that the Uprising would most likely have stopped, had
not another incident occurred immediately after the YMCA meeting. This one
was out of Mayor Sedita’s control but an implicit betrayal of his promises to
“alleviate the situation.”262 The youths—impressed “with the mayor’s courage
and concern which had brought him into the center of the Negro community to
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discuss the problems openly with them”263—peacefully filed onto the four buses
that had brought them to the meeting. Then, BPD officers unnecessarily and
violently set upon them. “Four police patrol cars passed by”264 and an unknown
officer, with no justification whatsoever, “shot a tear-gas pellet into”265 one of the
full buses, forcing all those inside to scramble from the bus blinded and violently
coughing. This incident, an unwarranted attack by armed agents of the very same
city government they had just been negotiating with, understandably “left many of
the youths”266 to feel “they had been betrayed.”267 While Sedita himself had not
ordered this, armed agents of his police force had attacked the very same people
he had just spoken with just minutes before, leading many to believe the mayor
had negotiated in bad faith. The students resultingly reorganized and retaliated,
resorting back to collective violence. What followed was the Uprising’s, and
Buffalo’s, most violent night. 268 One youth insurgent told newsmen the following
day, “there wasn’t going to be no riot last night, and [then] they [the police] teargassed the bus.”269
Daytime negotiations resumed between student insurgents, Black leaders,
and city officials on the morning of June 30 at a downtown YWCA. After this
meeting, two pivotal incidents occurred, one during the meeting and one later.
Both demonstrated the effect the insurgency had had on the city's
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“establishment,”270 conservative Black leadership, as well as the internal structure
of the insurgents themselves. At the end of the meeting, with “the reek of tear gas
still [clinging] to some East Side stores,”271 an ad hoc group of Buffalo’s African
American powerbrokers handed Sedita “a two-page single-spaced typewritten
sheet of”272 twenty-four “demands,”273 covering all issues from school reform to
an end of indiscriminate use of tear gas and K-9 units. First among this list was
the most central grievance of the entire student-insurgency: jobs. “‘a minimum of
3,000 jobs to be provided youngsters from the Negro area.’”274 These official
demands put forth the morning after the most violent night in the history of
Buffalo showed the depth to which student insurgents had forced the city's
“establishment,”275 gradualist, conservative Black leadership into concrete action.
Presenting these demands to the city’s highest elected official represented a
genuine attempt by Buffalo’s Black leaders to leverage the collective violence and
main concerns of student insurgents into real change. Further, the demands
revealed not only the earnestness of Buffalo's Black leaders, but the genuine fear
student insurgents had put into them. The same African American leadership that
had just two days earlier met and publicly stressed with Sedita “violence and
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destructive actions are not going to solve anything”276 had suddenly changed their
approach.
Student insurgents’ daytime demands changed as the status of Black
Buffalo shifted from an over-policed ghetto before the Uprising to a harshly
occupied, physically cordoned off section of the city (by this point, law
enforcement had used so many tear gas canisters that “supplies began to run low
[by the 28th and] another 136 shells were supplied to the Erie County Sheriff’s
department”277 from other counties). The next day, June 30, in the Masten
Community Center, students met with Mayor Sedita and newly appointed Special
Assistant for Urban Affairs, former baseball star, Jackie Robinson. They declared
that they either achieve their demands or more violence would ensue:
The meeting was marked by a walkout by a slim, impassive Negro youth
and his followers. The youth, wearing sunglasses and identifying himself
only as Jim, told Mayor Sedita: ‘You’ve got to take the police out. If the
police are still in there tonight, you will have to cope with it.’ Mr. Sedita
quickly retorted: ‘We’ll do that. We’ll cope with it.’ The young man and
several of his followers stood up and left the room. As [Jim] walked into
the hallway, the youth said: ‘I held up the riots last night. I told them to
wait. Now it’s out of my hands.’278
It becomes readily apparent that not only did student insurgents have tangible
demands, but they had a sense of internal ranking—leaders and followers—which
maintained some control over the level of violence fellow non-student
compatriots conducted. This internal structure permitted insurgent’s demands to
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evolve, for example from summer jobs to the removal of the mass law
enforcement presence in the East Side, as the Uprising progressed.
From June 26 to July 1, 1967, Buffalo, New York witnessed an organized,
student-driven insurgency. Participants differentiated their actions based on time
of day and circumstance, revealing a coherent flexibility to their methods and
intentions. From the pre-meditated identification of discriminatory businesses to
meetings with city officials, student insurgents displayed a deep unwillingness to
permit the viciously racist status-quo to continue. The students had finally said
enough, refusing to peacefully accept another summer of poverty, without
employment or prospects and responded in a multi-faceted—violent and nonviolent—truly organized way.
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Epilogue
Within a few weeks of the Uprising, Mayor Sedita acquired some four
hundred summer jobs for Black youths through the Chamber of Commerce.279
The city backed off its massive show of police force, and local business leaders
promised to do “more”280 for the city’s African Americans. But 1967 did not
witness the more significant structural changes required to give concrete credence
to these concessions, such as an end to destructive urban-development programs,
the Board of Education's segregation campaign, or BPD’s hiring discrimination.
This meant that in the long run, the city’s concessions meant little. As one twentynine-year-old Black steelworker and father explained to New York Times reporters
three months after the Uprising: “Nothing’s changed.”281 However, it would be
unfair to say the student insurgents who took to the streets between June 26 and
July 1 did not achieve something extraordinary: concessions that would have
never been otherwise granted from prominent businesses and political figures. As
one “young Negro leader”282 told reporter Sydney N. Schanberg, “‘[Sedita] went
into the ghetto once during the riots, and he’s never been back since. His
administration is 10 times better than previous ones, but he still doesn’t
understand…If he would stop seeing [Black] people as his enemies, as
conspirators, maybe he could take some significant steps…In one sense though,
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he’s right. It is a conspiracy, a conspiracy to make things move in this city.’”283
This “conspiracy” had achieved tangible economic concessions.
Understanding the Buffalo Uprising instigates repercussions in a larger
historiographical context. One of this paper’s central arguments posits that the
Buffalo Uprising was internally coordinated and deeply organized. This
hypothesis gives student insurgents a greater degree of legitimacy than if they
were considered to be mere rioters. When an individual laborer strikes, it means
little, but when a group does, it is a union. This analysis further discredits the
persistent narrative of the 1964 to 1972 rebellions as unconnected with the larger
Black Liberation Movement, instigated by illogical and criminal elements.
Coordinated student insurgency reveals the agency of impoverished Black
students' ability to collaborate and plan and react to changing circumstances and
pervading issues. For many Americans, it is uncomfortable to acknowledge the
fact that Black students deliberately organized to violently resist white
oppression. In doing so, they would legitimize the violence young African
Americans endured in every aspect of their lives at the hands of prejudiced
oppressors. Most Americans in 2022 believe that organized violence by
historically oppressed groups against their oppressors is not criminal, nor
illogical. For example, contemporary Americans acknowledge the underlying and
unjust oppression that existed before and after John Brown's 1830s raid on
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Harpers Ferry.284 Modern Americans extend those views to other applicable
examples, like the labor wars between striking workers and armed Pinkertons.
Because America is “a nation and a national culture created in part by the
extreme violence of the 1960s and early 1970s,”285 so many of its citizens cannot
comprehend that, in many instances, those who participated in these incidences
did so out of a political and organized desire for change. What America witnessed
in this era is far closer to the Palestinian Intifada of the 1990s, a collective
resistance to an oppressive occupation by violent agents of the state,286 than the
“ghetto-hoodlum” mob violence, in line with often portrayed sentiments by law
enforcement, the news media, and right-wing politicians.287
Part of the work of this paper has been to show the tremendous historical
agency of just one microcosm amongst the Uprisings across northern cities in the
1960s and 1970s, and the more than 2,000288 incidents that occurred across the
country. By conducting a deeper investigation into what truly happened in Buffalo
during that time, one can begin to understand just how effective one group of
student insurgents, in one city, at one time, became. Furthermore, as historian
Chris Myers Asch stated, studying Uprisings in smaller cities clarifies “our
understanding of the Northern civil rights movement, as places like Grand Rapids,
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Michigan, York, Pennsylvania, Buffalo, New York, do not have the same
bureaucracies or massive police forces that the larger cities of Detroit and New
York City do. What occurred here reveals so much of what occurred in the larger
picture and helps us move away from a Martin Luther King-centric, southernfocused narrative.”289 Consequently, this paper presented evidence that Buffalo’s
coordinated insurgencies echoed a similar pattern across the United States,
particularly in the de-industrializing urban north. What has emerged is a new
historical interpretation regarding the internal and external narrative about one
Uprising, in one city at one time. In Buffalo, Black student insurgents were
unwilling to accept the stultifying conditions forced upon them and rebelled in an
organized fashion. The students deliberately used their agency and influence to
leave city leadership with no choice but to meet their demands for improved
economic conditions, a chief goal of the Uprising.

289

Gawley, Matthew Philip. Interview with Dr. Christopher Myers Asch. Personal, November 30,
2021.

77

Bibliography
“113 Seized in Disorders; Pre-Dawn Court Held.” Buffalo Evening News. June 30,
1967.
"67: Buffalo Uprising". YouTube. Urban Legacy Filmworks, 2021.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QY2PO1X0Ib0&t=1404s.
Alfonso, Rowena Ianthe. “‘Crucial to the Survival of Black People’: Local
People, Black Power, and Community Organizations in Buffalo, New
York, 1966–1968.” Journal of Urban History 43, no. 1 (May 12, 2015):
140–56. https://doi.org/10.1177/0096144215583984.
Alfonso, Rowena Ianthe. “'They Aren't Going to Listen to Anything But
Violence': African Americans and the 1967 Buffalo Riot.” Afro-Americans
in New York Life and History 38, no. 1 (January 2014): 1–11.
Artis, Bill. “Night: Turmoil — Day: Peace, Witness to Looting, Vandalism Finds
Quiet Few Hours Later.” Buffalo Evening News. June 28, 1967, sec. III.
Besag, Frank P, Robert Hawkes, Lawrence Peterson, Edgar Shoulders, John
Melvin, Bertrand Austin, James Bell, Otis Bostic, Alfred Jackson, and
Arthur Green. Rep. "Preliminary Report on the Disturbances in Buffalo".
Buffalo, NY: Store Front Education Information Centers, 1967. URL:
http://www.math.buffalo.edu/~sww/0history/1967riots.html
Besag, Frank P. “Besag Papers, Riot Study, Interview #4 (*Cheryl's Comments
after Leaving Interview),” 1967.
Besag, Frank P. “Besag Papers: Besag Riot Study Interview #7 P.1,” 1967.
Besag, Frank P. “Besag, Frank P. ‘Besag Papers, Riot Study, Interview with
‘Colored Girl’, 11.,” 1967.
Besag, Frank P. “Besag Papers, Riot Study, Interview #13, 1.,” 1967.
Besag, Frank P. “Besag Papers, Besag Riot Study Interview #16,” 1967.
Besag, Frank P. “Besag Papers, Riot Study, Interview #37,” 1967.
Besag, Frank P. “Besag Papers: Besag Riot Study Interview #42, P.7,” 1967.
Besag Papers: Interviews 80-99, p.8, 9. Other, 1967.
Besag, Frank P. “Besag Papers, Riot Study, Interview #101, 2.,” 1967.
Besag, Frank P. “Besag Papers, Riot Study, Interview #107 (Colored Boy),”
1967.
Besag, Frank P. “Besag Papers, Riot Study, Interview #109,” 1967.
Besag, Frank P. “Besag Riot Study: Group Discussion,” 1967.
Besag Papers: Folder Marked “Interviews 126-138,” Paper Marked “Interview
(colored boy),” p. 10. Other, 1967.
Besag, Frank P., and Philip J. Cook. The Anatomy of a Riot: Buffalo, 1967.
Buffalo, NY: University Press, 1970.
“Black Power: Myth and Reality.” The New York Times, August 7, 1966.
Blakeslee, Jan. “‘White Flight to the Suburbs’: A Demographic Approach.”
Institute for Research on Poverty Newsletter 3, no. 2 (1978): 1–13.
Blatto, Anna. Rep. A City Divided: A Brief History of Segregation in Buffalo.
Partnership for the Public Good, April 2018.
https://ppgbuffalo.org/files/documents/data-demographics-

78
history/a_city_divided__a_brief_history_of_segregation_in_the_city_of_b
uffalo.pdf.
“Broken Promises Are Held At Root.” Buffalo Courier Express. June 28, 1967.
“Buffalo, New York, USA - Sunrise, Sunset, and Day Length, June 1967.”
Sunrise and sunset times in Buffalo, June 1967.
https://www.timeanddate.com/, n.d.
https://www.timeanddate.com/sun/usa/buffalo?month=6&year=1967.
Carroll, Maurice. “Buffalo Is Still Tense as Police Restore Patrols in Ghetto
Area.” New York Times, July 1, 1967.
“City, Negro Leaders Working To Prevent Renewed Disorders: Meet in Mayor's
Official East Side Calm Again After Night of Burnings, Vandalism.”
Buffalo Evening News, June 28, 1967, sec. I.
Fonda, Carolyn. Rep. "Progress Report Prepared by Miss Carolyn Fonda, Unit
Field Instructor at
Friendship House. Buffalo, NY: Friendship House, 1967.
Gawley, Matthew Philip. Interview with Dr. Christopher Myers Asch. Personal,
November 30, 2021.
Gawley, Matthew Philip, and Guy Cameron. 2nd Interview with Guy Cameron.
Personal, January 16, 2022.
Gawley, Matthew Philip, and Guy Cameron. Guy Cameron 1/9. Personal, January
9, 2022.
Gawley, Matthew Philip, and Ruth Kennedy. Ruth Kennedy Interview. Personal,
January 17, 2022.
Gay, Mara. “John Brown: Domestic Terrorist or National Hero?” The Atlantic.
Atlantic Media
Company, October 26, 2013.
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2009/12/john-brown-domesticterrorist-or-national-hero/347401/.
Goldman, Mark. City on the Lake: The Challenge of Change in Buffalo, New
York. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990.
Griffin, Domonique. “They Were Never Silent, You Just Weren’t Listening:
Buffalo’s Black Activists in the Age of Urban Renewal,” 2017.
Hill, Laura Warren. Strike the Hammer. The Black Freedom Struggle in
Rochester, New York, 1940-1970. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021.
Hinton, Elizabeth. America on Fire: The Untold History of Police Violence and
Black Rebellion since the 1960s. Liveright Publishing Corp, 2021.
Hinton, Elizabeth. “‘A War within Our Own Boundaries’: Lyndon Johnson's
Great Society and the Rise of the Carceral State.” Journal of American
History 102, no. 1 (June 1, 2015): 100–112.
https://doi.org/10.1093/jahist/jav328.
Hinton, Elizabeth, and DeAnza Cook. “The Mass Criminalization of Black
Americans: A Historical Overview.” Annual Review of Criminology 4, no.
1 (2021): 261–86. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-criminol-060520033306.
“History of Housing Discrimination Against African Americans in Detroit.”
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 2016. National

79
Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(https://www.naacpldf.org/files/ourwork/Detroit%20Housing%20Discrimination.pdf)
Johnson, Lyndon Baines. “Remarks in Kansas City, Missouri, at the Meeting of
the International Association of Chiefs of Police.,” Remarks in Kansas
City, Missouri, at the Meeting of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police. | The American Presidency Project (The American Presidency
Project, September 14, 1967),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/237772.
Johnson, Marilynn S. “Gender, Race, and Rumors: Re-Examining the 1943 Race
Riots.” Gender & History 10, no. 2 (August 1998): 252–77.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0424.00099.
Johnson, Thomas A. “Violence Called Only Language: Buffalo Rioters Say Pleas
Fall on Deaf
Ears.” New York Times. June 30, 1967.
Kerner, Otto, John Lindsay, Edward Brooke, Fred R Harris, James Corman,
William McCollugh, Charles Thorton, et al., Report of the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Washington: United States,
Kerner Commission: U.S. G.P.O., 1968.
Khouri, Rami G. “Towards a Global Intifada: From the US to the Middle East,
Pauperized Citizenries Are Rising up to Remove the Violent Governments
Ruling over Them.” Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, June 5, 2020.
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/6/5/towards-a-global-intifada.
Kimble, John. “Insuring Inequality: The Role of the Federal Housing
Administration in the Urban Ghettoization of African Americans.” Law &
Social Inquiry 32, no. 2 (2008): 399–434. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.17474465.2007.00064.x.
Kraus, Neil. Race, Neighborhoods, and Community Power: Buffalo Politics,
1934-1997. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000.
Lestz, Diana. “‘Like a Mad Geyser in the Moonlight’: The Harlem Riots of 1935
and 1943 and the Use of Surrealism in Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man,”
2013.
Letter to Victoria Wolcott. Introduction & Questions, (Email between Wolcott &
Matthew
Gawley) 2022.
Levy, Peter B. The Great Uprising Race Riots in Urban America during the
1960s. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
Mosey, Joseph Gerard. “Testing, Tracking, and Curriculum: The Isolation of
Black Students in the Buffalo Public Schools from 1917 to 1956,” 1998.
https://www.proquest.com/docview/304470915?fromopenview=true&pqorigsite=gscholar.
Orfield, Gary, Jennifer Ayscue, Jongyeon Ee, Erica Frankenberg, Genevieve
Siegel-Hawley, Brian Woodward, and Natasha Amlani. Rep. Better
Choice for Buffalo's Students: Expanding & Reforming the Criteria
Schools System. Buffalo, NY: Civil Rights Project/Proyecto Derechos
Civiles, 2015.
https://ppgbuffalo.org/files/bps_uclacrp_052315_v8_combined.pdf

80
Joseph, Peniel E. “Recasting 'Riots' as Black Rebellions.” The New York Times.
The New York Times, May 18, 2021.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/18/books/review/america-on-fireelizabeth-hinton.html.
“Plane to Get More Stocks of Tear Gas.” Buffalo Courier Express, June 29, 1967,
sec. I.
Rizzo, Michael F., and Genevieve M. Kenyon. Through the Mayors' Eyes:
Buffalo, New York 1832-2005. Buffalo, NY: Old House History, 2005.
“Robinson Sent To Buffalo Riot District: Ex-Dodger Star To Counsel Angry
Negro Youths.” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 1, 1967.
Sanes, Irving, Betty Cohen, and Claire Ives, eds. “Citizens Council on Human
Relations,” August 1967.
Sawyer, Charles, and Roy V. Peel. “1950 CENSUS TRACT STATISTICS
BUFFALO NEW YORK AND ADJACENT AREA,” (1952), pp. 1-39.
Schanberg, Sydney N. “Buffalo: 'Nothing's Changed' Since Riot; City Leaders'
Motives Are Sincere, But Negroes Insist on More Action.” The New York
Times, September 18, 1967.
Schwartz, Madeleine. “Streets of Fire: New Books Include Historian’s Narrative
of Brutality, Anger, and Revolt.” Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at
Harvard University, 2021.
https://www.radcliffe.harvard.edu/news-andideas/streets-of-fire.
“Sedita Seeks Help for Negro Youths from Employers.” Buffalo Evening News.
June 29, 1967, sec. 111.
Shellow, Robert. “The Harvest of American Racism: The Political Meaning of
Violence in the Summer of 1967.” University of Michigan Press.
Michigan Publishing University of Michigan Press, 2018.
https://www.press.umich.edu/9684889/harvest_of_american_racism.
Shellow, Robert, and Michael C. Dawson. The Harvest of American Racism: The
Political Meaning of Violence in the Summer of 1967. Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press, 2018.
Siskar, John F. “The B.U.I.L.D. Academy: A Historical Study of Community
Action and Education in Buffalo, New York.” Afro - Americans in New
York Life and History 21, no. 1 (1997): 1–16.
https://colby.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarlyjournals/b-u-i-l-d-academy-historical-studycommunity/docview/200848976/se-2?accountid=10198.
Steven, Taylor J. L. Desegregation in Boston, and Buffalo: The Influence of Local
Leaders. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998.
Sugrue, Thomas J. Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights
In the North. New York City, NY: Random House Trade Paperbacks,
2009.
Sugrue, Thomas J., and Andrew P. Goodman. “Plainfield Burning.” Journal of
Urban History 33, no. 4 (2007): 568–601.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0096144207299182.
Sullivan, Ronald S. “Review | How Over policing Causes Black 'Rebellion' - Not
the Other Way Around.” The Washington Post. WP Company, May 28,

81
2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/how-overpolicing-causesblack-rebellion--not-the-other-way-around/2021/05/26/7dd3ad6e-bd6511eb-9c90-731aff7d9a0d_story.html.
“Sunrise Sunset Times of Buffalo, NY, USA.” Buffalo, NY, USA Sunrise Sunset
Times. ©MAPLOGS, 2022.
https://sunrise.maplogs.com/buffalo_ny_usa.15409.html?year=1967.
Swan, L. Alex. “The Harlem and Detroit Riots of 1943: A Comparative
Analysis.” Berkeley Journal of Sociology 16 (1971): 75–93.
Taylor, Henry Louis. “Black in Buffalo: The Incomplete Victory of a People
Moving Forward Yet Losing Ground.” The Buffalo News. February 25,
1996.
United States Census Bureau, Census Tracts BUFFALO, N. Y. STANDARD
METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA § (1972).
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971),
https://law.justia.com/ (US District Court for the Western District of New
York 1971).
United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612 (1978) (United States District
Court for the Western District of New York August 1, 1978).
Warshauer, Mary Ellen, and Robert A Dentler. Rep. PUBLIC SCHOOL
SEGREGATION AND RELATED POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS
OF BUFFALO, NEW YORK. New York State Education Department,
1965. https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED012100.pdf
“'We Want Jobs,' East Side Youths Tell Adults.” Buffalo Evening News, June 29,
1967, sec. III.
Wilkerson, Isabel. The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America's Great
Migration. Vintage Books, 2011.
Wood, Amy Louise. “The Spectacle of Lynching: Rituals of White Supremacy in
the Jim Crow South.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 77,
no. 3-4 (September 2018): 757–88. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajes.12249.
Wolcott, V. W. “Recreation and Race in the Postwar City: Buffalo's 1956 Crystal
Beach Riot.” Journal of American History 93, no. 1 (2006): 63–90.
https://doi.org/10.2307/4486060.
Wolcott, Victoria W. Race, Riots, and Roller Coasters: The Struggle over
Segregated Recreation in America. Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2014.
Zubler, Bud. “Sedita Meets East Side Clergy, Reviews Plans: Mayor Invites
Ministers to City Hall to Answer Negligence Charges, Discuss Past
Gains.” Buffalo Evening News, June 29, 1967, sec. I.

